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2 Chapter 1. Introdution
Management and Eonomis are treated as distint sienes, yet they have
at least partially the same objet of investigation. Management and Eo-
nomis have mostly dierent methods of researh, yet the goaleieny
is similar. The former is onerned with the eient planning, organization,
leading, and ontrolling of an organization. The latter is onerned with e-
ieny in the prodution, distribution, and onsumption of sare resoures.
This duality is most pronouned in the onfrontation of business strategy
and miroeonomis. As dierent as the two elds might seem in the be-
ginning, the subjet matter is the same, the eonomially ating subjet,
and thus they should be able to nurture eah other. In the introdution to
Competitive Strategy, Porter (1980) argues that the eld of business strategy
laked an analytial base and that eonomis might serve for the development
of this basis, while itself being insensitive to the needs of business strategy.
The ounterpart of eah strategi deision is a reation of the market system.
Eah hange in the market system provokes an adaptation of the strategi
deisions. Reently this subjet reeives more attention in the literature as
well as in aademi eduation as for example in the text book Eonomis of
strategy by Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley (2000), whih aknowledges the
valuable insights a miroeonomi foundation an reate for business strategy
formulation.
The following three hapters analyze three dierent settings with eo-
nomi agents in their respetive markets. They try to foster understanding
of the miroeonomi interations in the market as a basis for business strat-
egy development in the sense of Porter. They all onlude with hints on the
eieny of market strutures and possible business strategies of the om-
panies when being ative in these markets in up- or downstream eonomi
interations. They are all self-ontained researh papers, and every hapter
is followed by a bibliography and an appendix.
Chapter 2 is a survey on a series of deep ase interviews with ar part
suppliers and ar manufaturers on their strategi supply and purhasing
behavior and it originates from joint work with Konrad O. Stahl and Frank
Wahtler. During the reent 15 years, the Automotive Industry has hanged
signiantly. Besides the developments in the downstream sale of ars, also
the upstream market from the very small produer of a small ar omponent
up until the OEMs themselves have undergone signiant hanges. Espe-
ially it has been observed that OEMs have redued the number of upstream
suppliers they are diretly dealing with, while their vertial depth of manu-
fature simultaneously dereased. This has given rise to new players in the
market, system or module suppliers. The survey ontains the answers of 15
suppliers and three ar manufaturers on questions onerning the parts sup-
plied, the organization of purhasing, the supply strategies, the information
3about other players in the market, the ontratual arrangements, and the
ompetitive situation. It disusses some fundamental fats of the automotive
industry in the light of eonomi theory, e.g. the issue of ontrat inomplete-
ness or information asymmetry, and it presents spei observations that we
regard as key ndings and impliations both for the industry pratie as well
as eonomi theory. The goal of the survey is to improve the understanding
of the dierent players' ations espeially under the reent hanges and to
analyze as well as evaluate the developments resulting from players' ations.
In the end this may add to reommendations for a more eient industry
struture in the future.
Chapter 3 omplements hapter 2 with a theoretial model on the sup-
ply behavior under the light of inumbeny advantages for one supplier and
swithing ost on the side of the prourer in an innitely repeated game. It
originates from joint work with Frank Rosar. We model a prouring rm's
problem of repeated prourement for a similar good. The prourer faes
two types of potential suppliers: one inumbent and several entrants. Only
the inumbent an make a relationship-spei investment, inreasing the
benets of the repeated ooperation for the prourer. The prourer faes
the main trade-o between reaping benet of repeated ooperation with the
inumbent, and foregoing that benet by awarding the ontrat to a possi-
bly more eient entrant while exerising higher market pressure. The role
of the inumbent is endogenous in the innitely repeated game. The goal
of the paper is to ompare two types of mehanisms that are derived from
stylized fats of existing prourement proesses. Referring to the automotive
industry, we identify one mehanism with the prourement behavior found in
Keiretsu-like relationships in Asia. Whereas the other resembles the (seem-
ingly) more aggressive prourement behavior in Europe and North Ameria.
We show that no prourement mehanism dominates the other. So the an-
swer to the quest for the best mehanism needs to be: both, depending on
the ability to realize benets from ooperation and to extrat the proeeds
afterwards from the suppliers. This should be reeted in the prourement
portfolio of rms, whih ould exhibit large variations, e.g., between stan-
dardized and new produts, simple and sophistiated produts, supply from
ountries with high or low ooperation potential. Furthermore, we suggest
that in long-term ontrat models the pressure on the suppliers does not need
to be lower, just beause one observes obvious market interationslike pro-
urement autionsless frequently.
Chapter 4 overs priing strategies of oligopolisti ompanies and origi-
nates from joint work with Andrey Ivanov. Conventionally, we think of an
inrease in ompetition as weakly dereasing pries, inreasing the number of
onsumers served, thus inreasing onsumer surplus, dereasing rms' prots,
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et. Here, we demonstrate that, under some tame irumstanes, an inrease
in ompetition may lead to a prie inrease in a horizontally dierentiated
market. We show this relationship for the petrol market in German ities.
The results of this hapter suggest, that for rms in a tight market it might
be the prot maximizing strategy to raise pries as a response to an inrease
in ompetition. Given that the rms only need to realize the prie elastiities
of their demand orretly, and without expliit ommuniation or ollusion
in the market, onventional measures of market onentration in order to
prevent monopolisti strutures might be misleading.
Bibliography
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2.1 Introdution
Game and ontrat theories with their extensions to the design of alloation
mehanisms, and their appliations to the theories of the rm and indus-
try are arguably amongst the most interesting and inuential miroeonomi
theories that have emerged during the last thirty-ve years. Bringing these
theories to statistial data, however, suers from the problem that many as-
sumptions essential in driving the results are well beyond the detail aptured
in the data. Hene many theories remain unheked empirially.
An additional important faet is brought in by the fat that eient on-
trats or other mehanisms proposed by theory are often never implemented
in pratie, beause sophistiated mehanisms may be unneessary, infeasi-
ble, or too ostly to implement. In view of this, it seems important to see
whih mehanisms are atually used, to seek the reasons for apparent ine-
ienies, and possibly to improve on them. In other words, the development
of new theory in this realm should rest on assumptions that are based on em-
pirially founded generi statements, rather than on assumptions that are,
while plausible, often rather ad ho.
With the present researh we attempt to ll the gap between theory
building and empirial observation and testing, by introduing a ase study
approah in whih the ase questions disussed are based on theory, and
the ontext in whih they are raised is hopefully speied to an extent that
allows the reexamination of extant theory, and new theory building. The ase
data are generated from in-depth interviews of the management personnel
of German automotive produers' prourement divisions, as well as of the
personnel of upstream suppliers' R&D, and sales divisions.
The automotive industry exhibits properties that rather ideally serve the
purpose. No other mass market onsumer produt is more omplex, and on-
sists of more individual produt spei parts, than a modern vehile. The
number of parties engaged in produing and ollating these parts is large,
and the interfaes between the parts are of a omplexity that neessitates
partiularly detailed oordination. Modern vehiles ontain an enormous
amount of innovative features in many tehnologial dimensions. Vehile
parts are idiosynrati to an extent that extremely few parts are used in any
two dierent vehile models, even if supplied by one automotive manufa-
turer (heneforth alled OEM, Original Equipment Manufaturer). All these
properties lead to ontratual relationships, in partiular between OEMs and
their diret suppliers, that span between very personal relational ontrats
and impersonal arms length relationships.
The automotive industry has hanged signiantly during the reent 15
years. Two features dominate. Firstly, the typial OEM's produt portfolio
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has broadened signiantly, to the extent that produt portfolios have be-
ome more similar. This, amongst other features, has substantially inreased
the intensity of ompetition between similar vehiles.
1
Seondly, the OEMs have outsoured signiantly. Yet at the same time
they also have redued the number of suppliers they are diretly dealing with.
New supplier types, alled system or module suppliers, have emerged. While
a system supplier is haraterized by integrating several omponents into a
funtioning system, module suppliers are merging neighboring omponents
that funtionally do not neessarily interat with eah other. Examples for a
system are the vehile eletronis, or the brake system integrating produts
from the brake pedal to the brake disks; and for a module the front end,
ombining the bumper, headlights, radiator and other smaller parts.
Many features of automotive prodution proesses have already been dis-
ussed in the literature. In partiular, the striking dierene between the
Japanese and the U.S. way of organizing upstream supply has been dis-
ussed in detail. Also the question of in- vs. outsouring has been subjet of
researh, as disussed, for instane, in the lassi example of General Motors
and Fisher Body.
2
Yet a large number of open questions remains related to positive and
normative aspets of organizing the upstream setor in the industry as a
paradigm example. Some of them are derived from the ase study evidene
in the sequel of the paper. They largely relate to the mode of upstream
innovation, and series supply prourement and ompensation shemes.
Our researh is geared by two interests. Firstly the methodologial one
introdued before. We wish to bring data loser to the theory and vie versa,
in the hope of mutual ross fertilization. In partiular, we attempt to show
where theory in its urrent state helps us interpreting what we observe. By
bringing data loser to theory, we also hope to lter out the pertinent models
from the overwhelmingly rih set of variants oered to date. Complementar-
ily, we hope to suggest aspets where additional theory is needed to explain
the empirial observations.
Seondly, we wish to ontribute speially to an understanding of the
players' ations in the automotive industry by analyzing and evaluating the
onsequenes of their ations, towards reommendations for a more eient
upstream interation, and industrial struture in this important setor.
The sequel of the paper evolves as follows. In setion 2.2 we outline our
ase study interview approah. In setion 2.3 we survey key ndings from
1
In the sequel we will only passim touh upon this interesting observation. The reasons
for this do merit further analysis.
2
See Klein, Crawford, and Alhian (1978) among others.
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in-depth ase interviews with senior management sales oials of upstream
suppliers, and prourement oials of OEMs in Germany, and struture them
by miroeonomi priniples. In setion 2.4 we derive researh questions and
hypotheses, that upon further analysis are geared to answer these questions.
We summarize in the onluding setion 2.5.
2.2 Case study interviews: approah
The fous of our ase study was on the inentive strutures involved in up-
stream prourement and their hange, primarily wrt. researh and devel-
opment, prodution planning and exeution, and also quality management
and logistis. All these dimensions an be addressed within formal ontrats
between the parties, as well as within informal arrangements.
Due to the omplexity as well as sensitivity of the issues addressed, we
hose an open, personal interview format. Interviews of on average about two
hours were onduted at the supplier level with senior management personnel
responsible for researh and development, prodution and sales; and at the
OEM level with management personnel responsible for parts prourement.
The interviews were organized around eight themati bloks, with a total of
some 70 general questions. These overed the produt disussed, its buyer
and supplier market, the ontrating proess for researh and development,
as well as series and spare part prodution, and nally the resulting after
sales market ativities.
3
The sequening of topis pursued in the interviews
was exible. The questions served to ontrol for ompleteness rather than
to presribe a strit shedule. The Appendix ontains questionnaire versions
for the upstream suppliers and the OEMs that mirror prourement from the
two player ategories' point of view. The questions disussing the same sub-
jet matter have the same number. The interviews were onduted between
November 2005 and May 2006.
Overall 45 upstream suppliers and 7 OEMs were approahed towards an
interview. The ompanies were olleted from the member list of the Verband
Deutsher Automobilunternehmen (VDA). All OEMs produing motorars
were onsidered. Upstream suppliers were seleted to generate a representa-
tive sample of the industry, where produt omplexity, ustomer speiity
and strength of market position are the key harateristis that dierentiate
suppliers. Interviews were onduted with 17 ompanies. Eah interview
of an upstream supplier foused on a representative produt range for that
3
After sales market ativities involve selling parts of vehiles that are no longer pro-
dued and sold anew, for whih the OEM extends an impliit guarantee that these parts
are made available for about 15 years after end of prodution.
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ompany. One of the suppliers was available for interviews in two divisions,
that are ating in eonomially as well as tehnially dierent markets.
In all, we onsider a total of 15 supplier and 3 OEM interviews in the
ensuing analysis. Of the OEMs interviewed, one is a high-volume vehile
produer and one is a pure premium vehile produer. The third oers a
mixed produt portfolio. Amongst the 15 suppliers, one was haraterized by
simple produts with a low ustomer speiity and a weak market position,
seven were haraterized by omplex produts with a low ustomer speiity
and a medium market share, six by omplex produts with a high ustomer
speiity and a medium market share and one by omplex produts with a
high ustomer speiity and a large market share.
4
Overall the interviewed ompanies had sales well in exess of EUR 100
billion, and employed more than 350.000 sta in 2004. The diversity of the
interviewed suppliers is also illustrated by their highly varying size, ranging
from sales of 200 million up until several billion Euros, and employment
gures between 2000 and well over 10.000. Average sales of all interviewed
ompanies were 6.8 billion and the median was at 1.9 billion Euros. The
average number of employees was 21.000, and the median number was 9.000.
Before we report on the results of our interview study, we should empha-
size that the interview results may be subjet to bias. Naturally we observe
only the rms surviving in the market. Firms unsuessful in the past are
likely to have exited. Sine the typial OEM is too big to fail, this self-
seletion bias is relatively more pronouned at the upstream supplier level.
In addition, of the ompanies still ative in the automotive industry, man-
agers of more suessful ompanies might be inlined to talk more openly
about their business, than managers of less suessful ones. Our intervie-
wees may also tend to overemphasize urrent business developments relative
to long-term hanges. For example, while we observe a long run inrease
in outsouring ativity, the interview partners emphasized the reent slight
bakswing. Many answers given in the interviews inlude very sensitive infor-
mation. In addition, supplier markets for ertain parts are thin, sometimes
with only two or three players in Europe or even world wide. Also the number
of OEMs worldwide is very limited. We have taken utmost are to anonymize
all statements.
4
The haraterization of suppliers was performed outside in via a luster analysis, based
on annual reports and auxiliary information available on their web sites.
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2.3 Prourement strutures in the automotive industry:
evidene
2.3.1 Overview on interation strutures
As emphasized before, there are very few standardized ommodities involved
in the upstream prourement for automobile parts. Most parts, even O-
rings or srews in a vehile are produed speially for one vehile model,
in spei size, material, or mahining. Thus there are very few produts
taken o the shelves to be sold to dierent ar produers, or even to one ar
produer as arry-over parts, towards use in dierent models.
5
The various parts are highly omplementary in development, prodution
and delivery. The prodution proess is very sensitive to supply delays, as
most parts are no longer held in stok. Often the parts are haraterized
by very omplex interfaes to eah other, a feature that aets researh and
development, prodution, and part funtioning, inluding part failure and its
onsequenes. In onsequene the ativities of all parts suppliers are strongly
omplementary to eah other when onentrating on one ar model.
All of this alls for omplex models of vertial restraints, with several
ompeting prinipals (the OEMs) and multiple ompeting agents (the rst
tier upstream suppliers). Theoretial models on vertial restraints are for
example overed in the survey by Katz (1989). Note that externalities abound
in this struture. The ations of one party aet the prots of many, if not
all others, but the party typially takes its deision based only on the eets
of its own prots or utility.
The interation is ompliated by the fat that endogenous xed and
endogenous variable osts interat in a very intriate way. R&D eorts on-
stitute a major part of xed osts. When oneptualizing a model, the OEM
typially thinks of so alled unique selling properties (USP) in whih the
model should provide innovative advantage over similar models oered by
ompeting OEMs.
6
Researh and development for a partiular part ould in
priniple be performed by the OEM, by his supplier, or by a joint eort.
However, the OEM typially diretly ontats partiularly innovative sup-
pliers, and adopts one of the gadgets developed by them, or initiates tenders
between a preseleted small group of potential suppliers, towards the devel-
opment of of a onept for these innovative parts along the desired speia-
5
In the automotive industry's jargon, all parts are alled ommodities that are similar
in all vehile models and produed without major R&D eort. This involves a large share
of parts but a small share of the total value proured.
6
These properties sometimes extend into the larger share of the OEM's portfolio of
models.
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tions. If several suppliers partiipate, then the onept ompetition phase for
that part ends with eah supplier submitting a proposal for the onstrution
of that part, inluding a prie quote for development and prodution.
Supplier eorts during this phase are most often not diretly ompensated
by the OEM. The supplier undertakes basi R&D eorts (about 10 per ent
of his total R&D outlay) at his own expense and risk, often in lose ontat
to universities and other researh failities, and presents the results to one or
several OEMs. In the ensuing pre-development phase the supplier engages,
sometimes in ooperation with a partiular OEM, in the development of
a prototype not geared towards a partiular vehile model, with the ost
again borne by the supplier or shared with the OEM. In most instanes, the
development of the model spei part is also onduted by the supplier, but
under the OEM's lose supervision. Sometimes this supervision is extended
into a joint development eort with the OEM.
Variable osts primarily arise per piee supplied. The OEM selets one
or possibly several suppliers to develop the part to prodution maturity.
Then often another tender is held, and the winner is awarded the series
prodution ontrat or portions thereof; for instane, the initial year of series
prodution. In most ases parts are proured from one supplier only at a time.
Dual souring, with the seond rm assigned a smaller share of prodution
volume, is rarely used amongst German OEMs. Finally, seond souring,
with a seond soure nominated, but no prodution share availed unless the
rst soure drops out, was not observed at all.
For many reasons inluding apaity utilization in development and pro-
dution as well as brand marketing, the typial OEM launhes individual
vehile models in dierent years. The observed pattern exhibits an overlap-
ping generations (OLG) struture. This is reeted in an OLG struture
of supply ontrats, often with the same supplier. When ontrating parts
for a new vehile model, the OEM frequently uses the oasion to renegoti-
ate prourement ontrats; in partiular pries, for parts built into running
models.
Shemes to reimburse the supplier's development eorts towards model
spei parts vary between overage of a xed share by the OEM, and ov-
erage by a mark up on prodution osts, rarely with a volume guarantee by
the OEM. Almost all prodution ontrats aount for learning ost savings
varying between 3 and 5 per ent p.a. The aforementioned renegotiations are
often geared towards the OEM's inreased partiipation in suh ost savings.
In the following subsetions we struture upstream-downstream intera-
tions, and our ase study evidene. This should help the development of
researh questions and hypotheses on upstream prourement behavior and
its eonomi eets pursued in the ensuing setion 2.4.
12 Chapter 2. Automotive upstream ase study
2.3.2 Contratual inompleteness
Upstream supply ontrats in the industry exhibit a variety that ranges from
very spei, to general framework ontrats that outline a general under-
standing between the supplier and the OEM on the prourement of a part
during the life yle of a model. The shell for all ontrat forms is typially
provided by the OEM withinGeneral Terms and Conditions. A development,
or supply ontrat typially ontains the following speis: Contrat dura-
tion; dates and terms of supply; parts speiations and hanges of those;
quantity, logistis (order ow); quality and warranty management; payment
terms; anellation payments, and intelletual property rights on newly de-
veloped omponents.
There are very few, if any, ontrats that an be alled omplete.
7
Inom-
pleteness arises wrt. elements that are tehnially not veriable (see below)
or are too ostly to speify in a ontrat. They also do not over all eventu-
alities (possible states of nature). Court ases are rare and thus veriability
is rarely an issue, for an obvious reason: Most interations are repeated, and
thus it is not in the interest of at least one ontrating party to draw the
opposing party into ostly ourt rulings.
8
More speially, our ase study interviews suggest inompleteness pri-
marily in the following dimensions.
Attributes of the part are inherently speied inompletely at the moment
the development ontrat is written. Conversely the supplier's devel-
opment eort intensity is both not speied and not veriable.
Quantities proured by the OEM are speied typially via the OEMs' tar-
get vehile output quantities over the model's entire life time. Yet the
eetive quantities demanded are dependent on the nal demand for
the model. That is realized only in the short-run, and eetuated in
the OEM's release orders weeks or days before delivery. The ontrats
speify the release order proedure. The supplier determines his a-
paity largely at his own risk. The OEM very rarely grants volume
guarantees.
7
Interview results: Contrats used are widely inomplete and augmented with (partially
not veriable) side agreements (Yes=7, N/A=9, No=2), suh that the value of ontrats
for the relationship is limited.
8
Results from the interviews for the use of ourt proedures showed 6 `No', 12 `N/A'
and no `Yes'. Amongst the 6 `No', 2 suppliers expliitly stated they would not engage into
ourt proedures on patent infringements, 2 would not engage in proedures against the
OEM, if he dislosed researh results to ompetitor suppliers, 3 stated that they would
not engage in proedures against OEM in general (also general disregard of ontrats was
mentioned).
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Reliability is typially exerised within ontratual terms, in form of maxi-
mal failure rates (parts per million) required by the OEM, and so are
payment ows when responsibilities for failed parts are learly iden-
tiable. Contrats typially remain unlear with respet to failures
involving externalities disussed below, in the setion on reliability risk.
Pries at whih the part is delivered to the OEM are always preisely spei-
ed for the initial delivery period, e.g. one year. Framework ontrats,
however, inlude further delivery periods up to over the model lifetime.
If suh a ontrat is written, then pries for ensuing periods are either
pre-speied, with stepwise prie redution shedules to aount for
learning eets on the supplier side; or pries are renegotiated annu-
ally. In either ase, prie speiations are likely not to be binding.
The OEM may enfore renegotiations under breah of ontrat, whih
ontributes to ontratual inompleteness.
Swithing suppliers: While the disontinuation of a supply ontrat appears
to be a rare event, the onditions for a disontinuation apparently are
almost never ompletely speied. One of the few provisions from the
prourer's point of view is the property right over model spei tools
typially also naned by him. While in theory the tool an be trans-
ferred between suppliers, the swithing ost involved in the transfer is
very high, as stated by both OEMs and suppliers.
There are other omponents of the supplier-buyer-relationship, that seem
to be not speied in ontrats at all. For example there was no report
on provisions that aount for a supplier's potential nanial distress. In
view of the omplementarity between the parts, the OEM's interest in an
uninterrupted ow of supply, and the high swithing ost involved in hanging
a supplier, it is in the OEM's short run interest to bail-out a urrent supplier
in distress.
9
Also, the OEM may want to enhane ompetition between
suppliers of similar parts by resuing his present supplier. However, this
obviously distorts inentives at the supplier level. Alternatively, under dual
souring, the seond supplier may be asked by the OEM to also produe the
distressed supplier's share, towards a gain in reputation against the OEM.
10
9
Six suppliers stated expliitly that they observed situations in whih the OEM would
provide ex post bail-out for suppliers in distress. One supplier delined this. 11 suppliers
did not provide an answer.
10
We have found one instane in whih a ompetitor of the bankrupt supplier was asked
by the OEM to provide bailoutthus resuing the ompetitorin exhange for favorable
supply onditions on another ontrat.
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Further aspets resulting in ontratual inompleteness are borne out in the
sequel.
2.3.3 Complexity of parts exhanged
Led by inreasing demands on vehile features suh as engine power, en-
ergy eieny, ative and passive seurity, or operating noise redution, the
engineering omplexity of vehiles has inreased enormously in reent years.
This has given rise to the question of delegating development and prodution
of a part rather than produing it in-house. When prouring a part, prob-
lems arise from the delegation of ontrol over development and prodution
proesses. We have identied three omponents:
Development omplexity arises from the fat that the delegation of devel-
opment tasks may lead to loal rather than global optimization in the
development proess. This problem is more relevant for parts that are
essential for the funtionality of, and very muh integrated into the
struture of the vehile suh as the power train; rather than those that
are inessential but with funtions that ontribute to the vehile's over-
all quality, suh as the ar interior.
The main drivers of development omplexity are the essential part's
interfaes to other parts and the intensity of required development in-
terations. One attempt to ope with this omplexity problem is to
have the supplier's engineers take residene at the OEM's development
site. We have found this being ommon pratie during the develop-
ment phase of essential parts.
11
However, this only partially resolves
the problem, sine innovation in systems or modules may be driven
by suppliers further upstream. In ase of the development of a sys-
tem or module, the system or module supplier has to orhestrate these
development eorts.
Logistis omplexity is the omplexity inurred in the assembly of the system
or module, and the sheduling of the assembled parts supply in the
speiation that is in immediate demand. The logistis omplexity is
driven by the number of sub- suppliers involved and the omplexity of
the interfaes between the parts proured by the supplier. For essential
parts this interfae tends to be very omplex. Some of the sheduling
problems are aounted for by the establishment of Just-In-Time (JIT)
prodution failities by the supplier lose to the loation where the
vehile is assembled.
11
Out of our interviewees, resident engineer shemes are reported to be used by 7, no
interviewee rejeted the use of residene engineers, 11 did not respond in this respet
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Contrat omplexity is the omplexity inurred by ontratual agreements
between the business partners, that arises from the outsouring of more
omplex parts. It ontains the ost of administering business ontats
with potential suppliers (inluding quality ertiation, et.) and the
atual ost of designing and exeuting the ontrat between the OEM
and atual suppliers (inluding the ost of quality ontrol, administra-
tion, lawyers, et.)
Overall the OEMs have reated to these dierent forms of omplexity by
the bundling of parts otherwise proured separately into systems or modules.
This should redue total omplexity problems between the OEM and the so-
alled rst-tier supplier. However, the redution of omplexity by inreased
prourement of systems and modules and systems at the level of the OEM
leads to longer supply hains, involving delegated monitoring.
We found two distint types of system or module suppliers: A rst type
proures and assembles all parts ontained in the system or module indepen-
dently of the OEM, and delivers it as one part to the OEM. While in this ase
the OEM enjoys minimum omplexity at least for logistis and ontrats, he
loses the diret ontat to the parts suppliers further upstream. The main
onsequene is a loss of ontrol over the development of the part.
A seond type only assembles all the parts, whih are proured by the
OEM. Whilst only the assembled part is shipped to the OEM suh that
the logistis omplexity for the OEM remains the same as with the rst
type system supplier, the OEM, by prouring himself, keeps ontat to parts
suppliers further upstream, at the expense of a higher ontrat omplexity.
Hybrids of the two models are ommon.
2.3.4 Risk and inomplete information
For eah part of a vehile in development, inomplete information of all
parties involved reates three major lasses of risk that need to be borne
by the OEM and its suppliers, namely innovation risk, volume risk, and
reliability risk. Portions of all risks are exogenous to the supply hierarhy.
For instane, volume risk is to some extent indued by random demand
shoks in the downstream ar market. However, there are also important
endogenous portions. For instane, volume risk is to some extent inuened
by the OEM's marketing eorts. In partiular, the reliability of the vehile
depends on the eort by many parties in the supply hain that goes into the
development (inluding testing) and the prodution of all the parts. In view
of this the risks need to be alloated between the partiipants of the supply
hain so as to reate eient eort inentives towards ontrolling these risks.
To be more spei, we onsider the following omponents:
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Innovation risk is the risk that either an innovation eort fails to ahieve
an ex-ante stated objetive, or the innovation is not ahieved at the
ex-ante expeted ost. Innovation risk diers between model unspe-
i basi researh and model spei adaptation development. Our
ase study evidene suggests that independent basi researh by the
supplier onstitutes only a small share (about 10 per ent) of his R&D
eort. However, the innovation risk involved in this remains fully with
him. The larger share of basi researh is ordered by the OEM, and
sometimes jointly pursued with him in a researh joint venture, whih
redues the supplier's risk. The remaining share of the supplier's R&D
eort onstitutes the model spei adaptation of innovation results.
While projet suess is almost sure, the remuneration of projet osts
is the major risk resting with the developing supplier, if the develop-
ment osts are reimbursed via a mark up on risky volume. Another
kind of innovation risk arises from the fat that nal onsumers' will-
ingness to pay for a partiular innovation embedded in a part may be
too low, relative to the ost of produing the innovative part. This risk
espeially arises when suppliers perform independent basi researh,
and post development, for the reason given, are faed with the problem
that OEMs are not willing to absorb the innovation.
Volume risk is the risk that the realized vehile sales volume is at variane
with the apaity determined on the basis of expeted volume. To the
upstream supplier the downside risk that volume is below expetations
and thus prodution apaity remains idle arries more nanial weight.
This risk is exogenous to some extent. However, the OEM's marketing
eorts are inuential. As ar parts are perfet omplements to eah
other, the risk arries over into the supply hain. Supply ontrats
almost never speify exat quantities. Even minimum quantities to be
absorbed by the OEM are rarely speied. However, if speied and the
atual numbers fall short of these, the OEM may agree to ompensation
payments that ap suppliers' risk.
12
Reliability risk is the risk that parts are subjet to a higher than expeted
failure rate. Additional omplexity in the risk involved is due to an
important externality. The failure of one part an indue the failure of
other parts. An extreme example is the failure of an O-ring that may
12
That OEMs guarantee minimum quantities is stated by 2 interviewees, 7 rejet the
use of minimum quantities. Out of the latter, 4 state the possibility of renegotiations
when quantities fall short of expetations, but with a strongly varying suess rate. 9
interviewees did not respond on this topi.
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destroy a ar's entire engine. The risk of individual part failure is to
a large extent endogenous and varies with the supplier's development
and prodution eort deision. The soure of reliability risk annot
always be identied. It is the OEM, however, who is exposed to the
quality risk vis à vis the nal onsumer, typially by a formal warranty
ommitment, and via reputational eets that may involve indiret
osts outweighing by orders of magnitude the diret osts of resolving
a warranty problem. Our ase study evidene suggests that in the
majority of ases failure an be attributed to the faulty part and the
supplier is billed the diret ost. Reputational risk, however, remains
with the OEM.
2.3.5 Asymmetri information
In upstream markets for buyer-spei parts suh as the one onsidered here,
informational asymmetries between OEMs and upstream suppliers take par-
tiular forms. By denition, the OEM should know best what suits his busi-
ness, beause that is determined by the nal onsumer's willingness to pay
for the entire vehile, omposed of many omplementary parts. By ontrast,
the supplier knows best the ost of developing and produing the good. More
speially,
R&D eort exerted by the supplier an only be inompletely monitored by
the prourer, whih invites moral hazard on the supplier side. Joint
development eorts, in partiular resident engineer shemes, redue
the informational asymmetry. Moral hazard is also ontained by the ex
post observability of the supplier's R&D suess embodied in a vehile
model, that may or may not invite repeated prourement from the same
supplier by the same OEM.
Cost information on development and prodution osts is a key private in-
formation of the supplier. During the initial prourement proess for a
new vehile model, the OEM an eliit ost information from the om-
peting suppliers; in the extreme form by asking them to reveal their
aounting numbers. Sine produts are idiosynrati, their produ-
tion is idiosynrati, so it requires a spei eort on the OEM's side
to uphold, or develop, skills towards evaluating ost strutures.
13
The ontinued prodution of parts is subjet to substantive learning
13
One OEM stated thatwhile fostering outsouringhe was losing this judging ability
due to the loss of tehnial expertise. Currently he is engaging in measures to stop this
drain of expertise.
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eets. Towards reduing informational asymmetries in ontinued pro-
urement phases, the OEMs generate ost estimates rst from the inter-
nal prodution of similar parts, as well as with the help of re-engineered
parts and a thorough ost analysis. When pries are renegotiated an-
nually under a framework ontrat, some OEMs organize inverse au-
tions, often by passing on onstrution blueprints to ompeting rms,
towards obtaining independent ost estimates. These are often used
to press on the inumbent supplier for ost redutions. Reently the
OEMs have aquired suient market power so that they an require
to an inreasing extent open book aounting, foring the supplier to
dislose his ost aounting sheme. This an only be protable for
the supplier if either he pursues "reative aounting" in order to hide
prots,
14
or if the OEM guarantees him an aeptable prot.
15
Cost monitoring by the OEM seems more onentrated on more valu-
able parts.
16
Also, the suppliers feel more squeezed when dealing with
a module supplier than with an OEM. Indeed, system and module sup-
pliers also may be fored to dislose their upstream ontratual rela-
tionships. The OEM may presribe the upstream partners and impose
a partiular ontratual relationship, via direted business.
Willingness to pay (WTP) by the OEM for a ertain proured part is de-
rived, in priniple, from the nal onsumers' willingness to pay for the
entire ar in the downstream market. Antiipating, and deomposing
that willingness to pay into the omponents supplied is one of the more
diult tasks in the design phase of a ar.
The OEM impliitly performs a hedoni prie deomposition,
17
and de-
rives his expeted benets by mirroring this with target ost aounting.
This ost aounting sheme serves to derive the OEMs WTP for the
part.
If a supplier has developed a novel gadget or feature on the basis of
his own R&D eorts, he an exploit monopoly power against the OEM
buyers. We found that when faed with the alternative to oer the
14
One supplier, who produes parts as well as the part spei tools, stated that the
ost aounting for the tools is muh less transparent than for the parts and that tools
show signiantly higher margins.
15
Apparently the open aounting sheme was adopted from Toyota, today onsidered
the world's most eient and protably vehile produer. However, Toyota seems to
guarantee an aeptable prot (or even prot sharing) in return, whilst this appears not
to be done by the German automotive produers.
16
Statement by one supplier: Best way to earn money is without attrating attention.
17
In all ases observed, this is done impliitly by asking the question of How muh more
would the onsumer be willing to pay for the ar if the gadget in question were inluded.
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gadget to one OEM towards its monopolisti exploitation in the nal
market, vs. to oer it more or less simultaneously to several OEMs, he
never prefers to oer it to one, but always to several OEMs - possibly
after the short term exploitation of monopoly under a short term (six
months to one year) exlusivity ontrat with one OEM. The rationales
given are twofold. Most gadgets are produed subjet to substantive
learning ost redutions, and due to limited enforeability of intelle-
tual property rights, ompeting suppliers ould ood the market with
lose (improved) produt variants.
Expeted prodution volume is an important prerequisite speiation for
the upstream supplier when determining his prodution apaity and
his unit ost; the latter espeially if both the xed development and the
xed prodution osts are naned via mark-ups on unit pries. The
OEM has an inentive to overstate the expeted prodution volume
when negotiating a new ontrat. Upstream exess apaity would
indue a more favorable ex post bargaining situation for him than a
apaity shortage, as the supplier's initially quoted per unit mark-ups
would be redued. By our observations, all suppliers antiipate this
and determine their apaity by disounting the numbers quoted by
the OEM by up to 30 perent.
Generally, by their own statements the players do not onsider very im-
portant informational asymmetries between rst tier suppliers and OEMs.
This should lead to relatively low information rents for all players. The
OEMs seem to be better informed about the suppliers than the suppliers
about OEMs. The OEMs learly engage atively in measures to redue the
suppliers' private information. Premium and volume OEMs assign diering
importane to the individual measures. Premium OEMs are more relutant
in the use of external measures to gain information suh as prourement au-
tions, in order to not urtail suppliers' innovation inentives. Instead, learn-
ing from past joint development ativities and from prourement with the
same supplier seems to be dominant. By ontrast, a volume OEM stressed
the importane of frequent pseudo-autions, as well as of re-engineering of
parts, as information gathering devies.
2.3.6 Mutual hold-up
Hold-up of the other party ould in priniple our in various ways. The
OEM faes hold-up risk by the supplier, as by delaying or disontinuing
delivery that supplier an bring the entire assembly proess to an expensive
halt. Additionally, during an ongoing development or prodution ontrat,
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the OEM faes the problem to inentivise the supplier towards exerting eort
on improving quality and/or reduing ost.
The supplier in turn faes the problem of potential leakage by the OEM
of the intelletual property inorporated into his produt, and the risk of
not being ordered the volume for whih he had designed apaity at a xed
ost. This problem is magnied when the supplier is not fully ompensated
upfront for his development and prodution xed osts. He then is unertain
about the ompensation of these xed osts in the fae of unertain quantities
delivered.
Although the OEM very often faes potential hold-up situations with his
suppliers we rarely see a supplier atually engaging in hold-up.
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We found
it only in the rare situation in whih a supplier not originally under ontrat
for series prodution was asked to step in, beause the original supplier was
onfronted with quality problems. Conversely the hold up of suppliers by
OEMs seems to gure more prominently in two ontexts: Some OEMs tend
to pass on intelletual property to ompetitors, or tend to delay payments
for delivered parts.
While ontratual penalties ould remedy the problem, they seem not to
play a major role in supply ontrats. They also were never mentioned as a
strategi option.
2.3.7 Swithing ost and lok-in
The prodution of buyer-, and beyond those, of model-spei parts by a
supplier indues swithing osts to both the supplier and the OEM. More
speially, swithing ost may arise from the following soures:
Produt spei intelletual property rights often reside with the upstream
supplier. Often there is a generi onit of interest between the up-
stream supplier and the OEM. Whilst the OEM would like to exploit
suh rights by exlusively using the part in his model (or models), the
upstream supplier is interested in selling variants of suh a part to om-
peting OEMs. No matter the resolution of this onit, the property
right inreases the OEM's ost of swithing to another supplier of that
part. While sometimes the OEM exerts his market power to enfore
the liensing of the property right to the supplier's ompetitors, suh
an enforement is invariably related to a loss in the OEM's reputation
as a reliable trading partner.
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A famous exeption is the hold up of Ford by Kiekert, a one time monopolist in the
prodution of ar loks, in Wahtler (2002).
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Prodution tools are the produt spei elements of a mahine to produe a
part. For example, the prodution of a body part neessitates a welding
press that an be used to press many dierent body parts, and a tool
that shapes the partiular body part. While the welding press is owned
by the supplier, the tool is by the OEM in all ases we have observed,
but only operated by the supplier. In priniple, this enables OEM to
withdraw the tool and to set it up with a ompeting supplier.
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Yet
the ost of reorganizing the supply stream appears so high that this
inident arises extremely rarely.
Proess know-how omplements the use of the tools to produe the ar part.
It is the apability to manage a partiular tehnology. In most ases
this knowledge is tehnially diult to transfer, and suh a transfer is
not enforeable. Together with the tools, the omplementing proess
know-how is idiosynrati and reates sizeable swithing ost to the
OEM.
Internal supplier ertiation on proess and produt quality as well as on
logistis proesses by the OEM is ostly. Indeed, internal supplier er-
tiation osts by the OEM exeed the external proess quality erti-
ation osts that are the prerequisite for a supplier to partiipate in
a tender at all. When swithing suppliers the OEM dupliates these
osts. The ase study evidene suggests that this is one of the main
elements onstituting swithing ost in a supply relationship.
Capaity that has been built up to supply the parts ordered for one vehile
model typially represents a substantive omponent of a supplier's total
order book. Within a Just-In-Time (JIT) manufaturing sheme the
apaity may have been built lose to the OEM's manufaturing outlet.
This apaity an not be easily reloated or adjusted to the prodution
of other parts, whih onstitutes the most important swithing ost to
the supplier.
Prodution downtime onneted with a swith of supplier is also a sizable
element of swithing ost. Even the transfer of one tool to another
supplier inits a sizeable loss on the prodution volume of a vehile,
if, as usual at urrent prodution logistis, the OEM does not hold a
buer stok of the part in question.
In all, sine the proured parts are omplementary to eah other, and de-
reasing ost tehnologies in development and prodution invite prourement
19
It also allows the OEM to indiretly ontrol the markets for spare parts produed with
the tool.
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from one supplier only, that supplier has, largely due to the swithing osts
arising for the OEM, an ex post monopoly in the supply of any part that is
essential for the prodution of that vehile. However, the supplier also faes
high short run osts of swithing to another buyer.
Both, OEMs and suppliers an strategially inuene the level of swith-
ing osts. Within limits, the OEM an try to avoid produt idiosynrasies
and the assoiated jeopardy of being held-up. He an engage in industry-wide
standardization (e.g. halogen headlights, tires), but this is learly limited by
his interest in speifying unique selling propositions for his vehile models in
the market.
Keiretsu-like strutures as used by the Japanese OEM's an also resolve
the hold-up problem.
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The OEM may also employ dual souring as a safe-
guard against lok-in by the rst supplier. Yet this option must be weighed
against an inrease in overall prodution osts (i.e. double the xed ost and
thus lower eonomies of sale).
The typial supplier has fewer means to derease the swithing ost for
him. By ontrast, he an inrease the typial OEM's swithing osts by
inreasing the level of intelletual property embodied in the part supplied,
so that irumventing the innovation is ineient and ostly for the OEM.
Despite the high swithing ost and lok-in potential we rarely see hold-up
strategies being played.
2.3.8 Contratual interdependenies
In the automotive market, OEMs produe many models. The suppliers sup-
ply parts for many models of many OEMs. This inevitably leads to multi-
market-ontat between upstream suppliers and OEMs. From our ase study,
we observe that at any time supply ontrats are interdependent, mainly in
the following variants:
Supply ontrats for innovative and standard produts: Many upstream sup-
pliers provide both innovative omponents and standard ommodities
to the same OEM. We found evidene that suh an upstream supplier
appears limited in exploiting monopolisti advantage in the provision
of the innovative produt. This, he feels, would indue the OEM to
withdraw from the supply relationship for more ompetitive produts.
Supply ontrats for high and low volume produts: Contrats, so the sup-
pliers, dier by volume in their attrativeness to the typial supplier.
Large volume ontrats appear to be more protable to the typial
20
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supplier than small volume ontrats - an indiret indiation for the
possibility that (portions of) information about dereasing osts re-
mains proprietary to the supplier.
OEMs also oer nihe models in small volumes, either beause they are
protable themselves, or beause there are positive branding spillovers.
At any rate, aording to our evidene, the OEM demands the supply
of small volumes for nihe produts when ontrating with the supplier
for large volume produts.
There is a third most important variant of ontratual interdependene
singled out below, namely an intertemporal ontratual interdependene.
Contratual interdependenies are virtually always indued by the OEM.
Only one premium OEM expliitly stated that he avoids bundling, while
fousing on the optimal ontrat for eah part.
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2.3.9 Repeated interations
A partiular form of ontratual interdependene arises when interations
between the same buyer and seller are repeated many times. Repetitions
may arise in the following form:
Repetition within a vehile model lifetime: There may be sequential ontrats
on the same vehile part. Two basi ontrat types have emerged. One
extends over one year, and an be (and in most ases is) extended on an
annual basis. The seond one, a framework ontrat, extends over half
or the entire model lifetime. However, pries are renegotiated every
year, with the option left to either party to disontinue the ontrat
without penalties.
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Repetition aross several vehile models: Owing to the OLG struture of model
supply, the OEM has to ontrat anew for struturally the same parts
when introduing a new model. The supplier of suh a part often
remains the same even when the part speiation has hanged. Our
evidene suggests that bargaining about parts supply for a new model is
frequentlyif not alwaysused towards renegotiating pries for parts
supplied for the prodution of an established model. The OEM often
onditions the award of a new ontrat to the supplier on an extra
prie redution on the old ontrat. In an exeptional ase the supplier
21
Result from the interviews: Bundling of ontrats is ommon pratie (Yes=13,
N/A=4, No=1))
22
Conrmed in 12 interviews
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would demand prie inreases on old ontrats in order to agree to a
new ontrat.
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2.4 Eets of prourement behavior on the automotive
industry: researh questions and hypotheses
In this setion we speify researh questions derived from the evidene ob-
tained, hek them against existing theory, and develop hypotheses to be
analyzed further theoretially as well as empirially. We distinguish between
two types of hypotheses: those related to the eieny of ontrating be-
tween the partiipating (two) parties, and those related to the eieny of
the upstream industry struture that results from the observed ontrating
strutures. In all of this we take as given the OEMs' outsouring deision.
What is then primarily at stake is the interplay between market pressure
and prot inentives exerised on upstream rms to innovate and/or to redue
prodution osts. These fores exerise impat on magnitudes invariant in
the quantity produed (innovation eorts, xed prodution osts) and on
quantity dependent magnitudes (marginal prodution osts, that are in turn
dependent on xed osts).
2.4.1 Why does the typial OEM exerise dominant market power in the
design and exeution (enforement) of upstream ontratual
relationships?
One of the most intriguing observations we extrat from our ase study is that
in the relationship between OEMs and rst tier suppliers, the larger market
power rests with the OEMs, and this in spite of the fat that some of the
tier 1 rms are sizeable, and some of the supplier-industries' setors (dened
by produt range) at this level are muh more onentrated than the auto-
motive produing setor itself. A key example is the automotive eletronis
subsetor, in whih until reently three and now two leading global automo-
tive suppliers dominate the market. Apparently, the automotive produers
largely set the ontrats with these tier 1 upstream suppliers.
This leads us to
Hypothesis 1: The OEM has larger relative market power beause he serves -
and thus is more knowledgeable about - the nal market. In partiular,
the inorporation of gadgets (developed and) provided by upstream
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Result from the interviews: Conseutive ontrats are bundled in an OLG struture
ours (Yes=10, N/A=6, No=2)
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suppliers is up to the disretion of the OEM, whih gives him additional
market power.
2.4.2 Is upstream R&D eiently organized?
Eient (joint prot maximizing) R&D inentives require that the returns
to R&D are fully appropriated by the agent engaging in it.
R&D eorts are redued if
• they are not fully ompensated for
• their beneiary is not sure about their full value, whih indues moral
hazard on the seller side
• they at omplementarily and are onduted by independent agents,
sine omplementarity indues (unompensated) positive externalities
in inreased eort provision.
Hypothesis 2: Upstream innovative eorts are ineiently small sine they
are omplementary to eah other and produed by independent agents,
and even smaller
• if the OEM indues ompetition between innovators and does not
ompensate their ompetitive eorts
• if the OEM oers ompensation of innovative eort only within a
prodution ontrat to one of the innovators, and ompensation
is subjet to volume risk.
Hypothesis 3: Inentives to upstream suppliers to invest in both model un-
spei R&D and into model spei adaptation are eient only if
eort results are fully internalized, and in partiular ontratual provi-
sions are suh that the use of R&D results an be appropriately liensed
out.
A natural onit arises between the innovative upstream supplier and
the OEM with whom he has developed the rst appliation of the innovation.
While the latter has an inentive to monopolistially exploit the innovation,
the upstream supplier is interested in its multiple appliation, as multiple
appliations indue downstream ompetition and lead to a realloation of
rents to the upstream rm.
Hypothesis 4: Overall eieny neessitates that R&D results are imple-
mented rst in premium models.
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Buyers of premium models typially exerise relatively seletive tastes
for partiular vehile features, and thus exhibit a relatively prie inelasti
demand. This allows the innovator to reoup his R&D osts with higher
probability in a shorter time window, even in a regime where learning ost
eets annot be exploited (as yet).
In order to redue the omplexity of organizing the supply of all parts of a
vehile, the OEMs started in the 90ies of the last entury to proure the sup-
ply of so alled systems and modules. There are two types of system/module
suppliers: Systems onsist of multiple parts that are funtionally onneted,
modules of physially onneted parts. A typial example for a system is the
eletronis system. A typial example for a module is a ar front end. While
system suppliers tend to be highly innovative, module suppliers ompile and
assemble parts from other suppliers often without entral innovative features.
The latter suppliers thus onstitute just another level in the supply hierarhy.
The delegation of system/module development and prodution implies
delegation of responsibilities on
• monitoring innovation in omponents that form parts of the system/
module in question
• oordination of interfaes between the omponents
• monitoring the prodution osts of these omponents
• administering reliability problems, and absorbing warranty payments.
Hypothesis 5: The vertial ow of innovation is inhibited by the delegation
of module or system development and prodution.
Past work on supply networks, e.g. by Baron and Besanko (1984, 1992,
1994), shows that the existene of asymmetri information ould, espeially
in steeper hierarhies, lead to higher ost for the prourer ompared to atter
hierarhies. At best the ost of the organizational form stays onstant with
the inrease of a steeper hierarhy.
In the theoretial literature the protability of hierarhies is typially as-
sumed. Yet Baron and Besanko (1992, 1994, 1984); Mookherjee and Reihel-
stein (1997, 2001); Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004); Melumad, Mookherjee,
and Reihelstein (1995) look at the potential ost of hierarhies, whih is in
the fous of the above disussion on asymmetri information, lok-in, or loss
of ontat to innovative suppliers in the prodution hain. Radner (1993);
Gruener and Shulte (2004a,b) over the optimal organization of hierarhies
under onstrained proessing power of the partiipating units, whih an also
be related to omplexity ost.
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2.4.3 Are parts eiently pried?
By a standard argument, the pries of omplementary goods are too high
relatively to joint prot maximizing pries if determined independently, sine
omplementarity indues negative externalities from higher pries.
Hypothesis 6: At given levels of innovation, asymmetri information allows
upstream produers to set ineiently high parts pries, espeially if
upstream markets are onentrated and the OEM is inompletely in-
formed about upstream (innovation and) prodution osts.
2.4.4 Do ontratual interdependenes inrease the eieny of supply
ontrats?
In the world of rst-tier supply ontrats, ontratual interdependenes are
apparently generated and enfored by the OEMs. A primary driver appears
to be the OEM's interest to use his agenda setting power in substituting
for informational asymmetry. In the sequel, we onsider hypotheses under
the assumption that ontratual eieny is dened by the sum of surpluses
generated by the two bargaining parties.
Hypothesis 7: The onstrution of ontratual interdependene between sup-
ply ontrats for innovative and standard parts is eieny dereasing.
Hypothesis 8: The onstrution of ontratual interdependene between high
volume and low volume produts is eieny dereasing.
Hypothesis 9: The onstrution of ontratual interdependene between new
and running ontrats via prie renegotiation in urrent ontrats de-
reases long run eieny.
Contrats are inomplete and thus, by now standard arguments (Hart and
Moore, 1999; Grossman and Hart, 1986) annot fully disipline the partners
beause they give rise to ex post opportunism. Contratual solutions to ex-
post opportunism are treated e.g. by Che and Chung (1999), who nd that
the supplier hooses an eient investment level only if arrangements are
made suh that he an at least reoup the initial investment from later pay-
ments even after renegotiations. Repeated interations (eventually innitely
often, or by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) disontinuation
with low enough probability) an serve as a disiplining mehanism one
they involve trigger strategies by the players, thus balaning the inentives
for a partner to defet from the agreed ontrat by oering a high hane of
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repetition one eah ontrat is honored, and disontinuation otherwise. See
also Blonski and Spagnolo (2002).
The upstream supplier's inentives to redue unit osts are dependent on
his ability to absorb the benets of his ost reduing eort. His preferene of
a high volume over a low volume ontrat suggests that the supply of high
volumes is more protable. This must imply that when designing the prie
deline lauses within a long term ontrat, the OEM annot fully antiipate
the ost redution eets due to learning.
If the ontinued engagement with the same supplier in both R&D and
in parts prourement would open hannels by whih information about ost
redution enjoyed by the supplier were revealed to the OEM as time goes by,
then it would be protable for the OEM, and possibly joint prot inreas-
ing, to renegotiate pries.
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It so far has not beome lear whether the prie
renegotiation frequently enfored by the OEMs is ever due to improved in-
formation, or more due to the short term opportunisti use of market power.
At any rate, intertemporal ontratual interdependenies inrease swithing
osts and, in onsequene lead to restrited entry into upstream market.
2.4.5 How do the players ope with mutual hold-up?
Here we assume that hold-up exerised by an agent is observable to the agent
subjet to.
Hypothesis 10: Hold-up by a supplier is washed out by ontratual interde-
pendene, and in partiular by repetition.
Hypothesis 11: Hold-up by the OEM via fored prie renegotiations is sus-
tainable by pure market power, but ineient even if suppliers ex ante
inorporate it in their alulus.
2.4.6 Does inreasing downstream ompetition redue upstream
innovation and produt reliability?
Downstream ompetition for any partiular vehile type (speied by size and
quality) an be thought of as taking plae in three major dimensions: Innova-
tiveness, reliability, and prie of the vehile. For any given R&D outlay, there
is a trade o between innovativeness and reliability: the more innovations
embedded in a new vehile model, the less these innovations an be exposed
to (expensive) test routines. Inreasing downstream ompetition leads to
inreasing pressure on the downstream sales prie for the vehile, as well as
24
Meyer and Zwiebel (2006) treat this problem in a theoretial model.
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to pressure on time-to-market, the time elapsing between the oneption of
a new model and its presentation in the market.
The Japanese automotive industry tends to produe ompetitively pried,
reliable vehiles with a lower level of innovation.
25
This allows in partiular
to use seond mover advantages by introduing innovations that are already
tested by other players in the market, whih also redues the time-to-market.
One possibility to dierentiate that is adopted by European vehile pro-
duers, is to introdue more innovative but, given the limitations on the
time-to-market indued by ompetitive pressure, less reliable vehiles. In
view of the pressure on returns and time-to-market, upstream suppliers are
simply left with the problem of produing at a given level of innovativeness
and a given time-to-market, less reliable parts.
Additional pressure in this diretion may be generated by suppliers' op-
portunism. Innovativeness signals an be protably exploited in the very
short run by the supplier within the upstream ompetitive ontext, and by
the OEM upon the introdution of a model, whilst reliability problems tend
to arise later in the model life yle, and are largely absorbed by the OEM.
Hypothesis 12: Inreasing downstream prie ompetition may lead to re-
dued produt reliability.
2.4.7 Are development, volume, and reliability risks alloated eiently?
Eonomi theory suggests that if a ertain risk is exogenous, it should be
alloated suh that the risk neutral party absorbs this risk. By ontrast, if a
risk is endogenous, the player able to inuene this risk aording to theory
should absorb the payos, suh that the inentives to manage the risk are
optimally set; see, for instane, Tirole (2003).
Let, in line with by now standard reasoning, the degree of risk aversion of
the rms in the value hain be diretly related to their size, with the OEM
as the biggest player being risk neutral.
From a theoretial point of view, the suppliers seem to be alloated an
ineiently high share of volume risk while on the other hand their share of
reliability risk seems to be below the eient level.
Hypothesis 13: If innovative eort primarily rests with the supplier, then
he should absorb the assoiated risk. If the OEM absorbs a share of
it, then it should be made dependent on the supplier's degree of risk
aversion.
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The only exeption to this general rule is the hybrid engine ar.
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We observe that the OEMs take over a share of the xed prodution osts
of suppliers through naning the OEM spei tools. Yet the larger share
of the xed osts, espeially innovation adaptation osts and apaity osts
are typially not ompensated diretly but spread aross parts purhased by
the OEM. As the OEM rarely provides volume guarantees, this alloates a
share of volume risk to the supplier. The OEM typially overstates expeted
volumes during negotiations, that if used in the supplier's alulation would
derease his expeted average ost and make him lenient to a low prie oer.
However, suppliers antiipate this and typially alulate their oer pries
up to 30 perent deated volume estimates.
From a theoretial point of view, both the exogenous as well as the en-
dogenous proportion of demand unertainty suggest that it is eient to have
the OEM bear the assoiated volume risk.
Hypothesis 14: The OEM should bear a larger share of the volume risk than
the supplier.
As disussed above there exists a substantial reputation risk, from whih
the OEM suers most. This risk an not be transferred to the suppliers,
even if the size of the risk stays largely under the inuene of the suppliers,
for example if the suppliers' eort for quality of spei parts determines the
reliability of the whole ar.
Hypothesis 15: Reliability risks, inluding ollateral damage, should be al-
loated to the soure as far as possible. Reliability risks involving
unobservable soures should be pooled.
2.4.8 Is ost monitoring performed eiently?
In order to keep prodution ost down, the OEM might engage into moni-
toring ativities of all parts proured. Cost monitoring involves a large xed
ost omponent. Hene the OEM has an inentive to alloate more moni-
toring eort to the prodution of more valuable, rather than less valuable
parts. This inentivizes the supplier to ahieve higher ost savings and thus
higher margins with lower valued parts. In passing, this has impliations on
upstream suppliers' relative inentives to supply diretly to the OEM vs. to
supply to a module or system supplier. He prefers to supply to the former, as
the relative value of the same part supplied is the smaller, the more valuable
the end produt.
Hypothesis 16: Independent of risk premia, supplier margins are inversely
related to the relative value of the part. This indues alloative ine-
ieny.
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Suppliers fae the risk of bankrupty, whih is partly exogenous, e.g. due
to unexpeted rises in raw material pries. The alloation of this risk should
be orreted in view of the strit ex post omplementarities between the
upstream supply ows for urrent prodution, and in view of the fat that
while maintaining a more ompetitive upstream supply struture is helpful
for all OEMs, the individual OEM an internalize only part of this externality.
Exogeneity of the auses of nanial distress implies that gambling behavior
by the upstream supplier is not invited.
Hypothesis 17: OEMs should orhestrate eorts to bail out suppliers if dis-
tress is exogenously aused.
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2.4.9 Does OEM behavior indue an eient upstream industry struture?
In a purely prie driven ompetitive situation, an OEM should be interested
in more ompetition at eah level in the upstream value hain. This result
an be derived from standard aution theory or Cournot oligopoly theory
(f. e.g. Tirole, 2003; Krishna, 2003), where typially the revenue of one
side of the market inreases with the level of ompetition on the other side
of the market. In this respet the ase material apparently onrms the
theory. OEMs as well as suppliers stated that a very onentrated upstream
market does not allow for a full extration of prots from the suppliers. One
partiipant stated that two suppliers were not enough to eetively build up
prie pressure on the supply market.
However, revealed preferene suggests that it is at least in some OEMs'
interest to restrain ompetition. Espeially premium ar manufaturers en-
gage into the pratie of assigning ore suppliers, to whom they award most
of the ontats, thus hoping for a higher degree of innovation and reliability.
Yet one premium OEM stated expliitly that together with other OEMs he
subsidizes the entry of an additional supplier in a very onentrated market.
This strategy was also mentioned by several upstream suppliers. In all, it is
unlear whether the optimal level of upstream ompetition from the OEM's
point of view orresponds to an optimal level onerning industry inentives
for innovation and reliability.
Hypothesis 18: The assignment of ore suppliers by OEMs reates entry bar-
riers and thus an ineiently onentrated upstream market struture.
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One volume OEM expliitly suggested this strategy.
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2.5 Conluding Remarks
Our ase study interviews foused on a broad range of phenomena in the
supply hain of the automotive industry we onsider worth further theoret-
ial investigation. We onsider interesting in partiular questions related to
naning innovation inluding alloative onsequenes, and the alloation of
risks in the value hain.
Several aspets may also be worth a more detailed empirial analysis.
Among others, this onerns the pursuit of innovative ativities by suppliers,
initiated by or onneted to partiular OEMs. Why is there barely no ve-
hile model independent researh ativity of the suppliers? Also, is there a
relationship between part type and ontrat length? In partiular, are more
omplex parts supplied within longer term ontrats? And why does module
or system outsouring not emerge as predominant manufaturing organiza-
tion, given that it apparently leads to tighter ost ontrol?
A question not disussed here relates to the driving fores behind in-
reasing ompetition in the automotive industry that was assumed in the
speiation of our hypotheses. One lear sign is that automotive produers'
produt portfolios have beome muh more similar during the last ten years.
Unless the typial onsumer's hoie of brand dominates her hoie of ar
size and style, this move observed in the entire industry is bound to lead to
inreasing ompetition.
We found systemati exess apaity at the OEM level in need of ex-
planation, less so at the supplier level. Also, hanges in the tehnology of
produing automotive vehiles are all towards higher shares of xed to vari-
able osts. A typial example are ever inreasing shares of software in the
ar. This intensies questions as to appropriate linear or better, nonlinear
priing shemes.
On a broader sale, one might ask for the OEMs' role model in the au-
tomotive industry in the future, given reent and ongoing hanges in inno-
vation ativities, tehnology proliferation, and ompetition intensity. Whih
ativities remain in their generi ompetene, whih ones will, or should be
outsoured?
We hope that further work will be able to solve some of the open ques-
tions and thus further ontribute to bringing together eonomi theory and
empirial ndings in one of the major industries in the world.
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1.1.1. Was sind Ihre strategishen Ziele für den betrahteten Pro-
duktbereih für die Zukunft? (System- oder Teilelieferant,
Know-how Fokussierung)
1.1.2. Welhe Produkte (Systeme, Module oder Teile) werden von
Ihnen auÿerdem produziert bzw. eingekauft?
1.1.3. Ist hierbei Ihre Rolle als System- oder Teilelieferant von Be-
ginn an festgelegt oder entsheidet sih dies im Laufe der En-
twiklung? Wann entsheidet sih dies im letztern Fall typis-
herweise?
1.2. Wertshöpfung
1.2.1. Welhen Wertanteil hat das betrahtete Produkt an einem
Fahrzeug? Was sind die durhshnittlihen Einkaufskosten
und Verkaufspreise für dieses Produkt? Was ist die typishe
Umsatzmarge?
1.2.2. Welher Anteil der Wertshöpfung wird vom Systemlieferan-
ten, welher von dem (den) Teilelieferanten geshaen?
1.2.3. Inwieweit untersheiden sih Module/Systeme von Einzel-
teilen in Produktion und Einkauf hinsihtlih Lernkurven-
Eekten (Kosteneinsparung über Zeit; x
1.3. Tehnologie und Innovation
1.3.1. Wie komplex ist das betrahtete Produkt? Kann es leiht
imitiert werden, weil alle Tehnologien zur Herstellung des
Produkts allgemein bekannt sind? Bestehen Patentrehte auf
Systeme, Module oder einzelne Teile?
1.3.2. Wie beurteilen Sie die tehnologishe Entwiklung der letzten
5 Jahre im Umfeld Ihres Produktes (insbesondere vor dem
Hintergrund einer stärkeren Fokussierung auf Fahrzeugelek-
tronik und Soft- gegenüber Hardware)?
1.3.3. Wie spezish für ein bestimmtes Fahrzeugmodell oder einen
OEM ist das Produkt in der Entwiklung und in der Produk-
tion?
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1.3.4. Wie komplex sind die Shnittstellen (Entwiklung und Ein-
bau) zum restlihen Fahrzeug (Umfang des Lastenhefts, In-
teraktion mit anderen Bauteilen/Systemen)?
1.3.5. Wie hoh sind die Innovationszyklen im betrahteten Pro-
dukt? Wie lange dauert es erfahrungsgemäÿ, bis eine Innova-
tion auf dem Markt ersheint?
1.3.6. Beshleunigt oder bremst die Vergabe von Modulen/Systemen
an Systemlieferanten die Zeit zwishen Entwiklung und
Markteinführung eines Fahrzeugs im Vergleih zur Eigenen-
twiklung durh den OEM?
2. Kunden
2.1.1. Mit welhen Unternehmen unterhalten Sie zu diesem Produkt
Lieferbeziehungen?
2.1.2. Welhe anderen Produkte liefern Sie auÿerdem an diese Un-
ternehmen? In wiefern wird die Lieferung vershiedener Pro-
dukte (z.B. über Baureihen) oder Projektbündel gemeinsam
verhandelt oder bestehen Rahmenverträge?
2.1.3. Welhe strategishen Implikationen ergeben sih aus Ihrer
Siht aus der Verbreiterung der Produktpalette durh
Fahrzeughersteller, z.B. durh die BMW 1er- und X-Serie,
den Porshe Cayenne oder die Meredes A-Klasse bzw. den
Maybah? Wie denken Sie wird dies von den Konsumenten
beurteilt?
2.1.4. Wie beurteilen Sie die Bedeutung der Produktein-
führungszeiten? Läÿt sih eine Tendenz zu kürzeren
Produkteinführungszeiten oder -lebenszyklen feststellen und
wie wirkt sih diese aus?
2.1.5. Hat sih aus Ihrer Siht der Wettbewerb zwishen den OEMs
erhöht? Was sind Ursahen hierfür (z.B. stagnierende Absatz-
zahlen, Überkapazitäten, et.)? Wie hat sih dies gegebenen-
falls auf Sie ausgewirkt?
3. Anbieter (im gleihen Produktmarkt)
3.1. Marktstruktur
3.1.1. Wie groÿ ist der Markt für das betrahtete Produkt in
Deutshland, Europa, weltweit (Umsatz, Stükzahlen)?
3.1.2. Wie viele Wettbewerber existieren für das betrahtete Pro-
dukt in Deutshland, in Europa, weltweit? In welher
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zeitlihen Reihenfolge erfolgte der Markteintritt Ihres Un-
ternehmens und der Ihrer Wettbewerber?
3.1.3. Wie verteilen sih die Marktanteile unter den angesprohenen
Wettbewerbern?
3.1.4. In welhem Umfang hängt die Anzahl der Stufen in der Liefer-
antenhierarhie ab von der Innovationsfrequenz im betra-
hteten Markt, der Komplexität des betrahteten Produkts,
der Volatilität der Nahfrage nah dem Produkt, dem Wet-
tbewerb im entsprehenden Produktmarkt oder im Fahrzeug-
markt allgemein?
3.2. Anbietereigenshaften
3.2.1. Gibt es tehnologishe Untershiede zwishen den Wettbewer-
bern?
3.2.2. Welhe Informationen haben Sie über Tehnologie und
Kostenstrukturen Ihrer Wettbewerber?
3.2.3. Was ist Ihre Eigentümerstruktur? Welhe Eigentümerstruk-
tur haben Ihre Wettbewerber, Zulieferer und Kunden?
3.2.4. In wieweit hat aus Ihrer Siht die Entwiklung und Stärkung
einer eigenen Zulieferer-Marke, z.B. durh Bosh, Einuÿ auf
den Wettbewerb unter Zulieferern?
3.3. Globalisierung
3.3.1. Welhen Einuÿ hat aus Ihrer Siht die Globalisierung der
Industrie (OEM und Zulieferer) auf den Wettbewerb?
3.3.2. In welher Form und weshalb verfolgen Sie heute und in
der Zukunft eine Globalisierungsstrategie (Zentrale Produk-
tion (High Teh vs. Low ost) und weltweiter Vertrieb vs.
Lokale/OEM-nahe Produktion und Vertrieb)?
3.3.3. In wieweit erfolgt eine Produktionsverlagerung gemeinsam
mit anderen System- oder Teilelieferanten oder OEMs? Wer
führt die Initiative an? In wieweit erfolgt eine (nanzielle)
Unterstützung durh andere Unternehmen, insb. den OEM?
3.3.4. In welhem Umfang führt eine Globalisierung der Produk-
tion zu einem verstärkten Wettbewerbsdruk auf Seiten der
System- oder Teilelieferanten, z.B. über Seond Souring?
4. Anbieterauswahl
4.1.1. Wie beurteilen Sie die Auslagerung der Herstellung von
ganzen Systemen oder Modulen vom Fahrzeughersteller zu
38 Chapter 2. Automotive upstream ase study
sog. System- oder Modullieferanten und damit die Entwik-
lung von mehrstugen Zulieferhierarhien? Worin sehen Sie
Vor- und Nahteile einer solhen Entwiklung?
4.1.2. Was sind die wihtigsten Shritte in der Lieferantenauswahl
durh Ihre Kunden? Findet eine Auktion (Entwiklung und
Produktion) zwishen vershiedenen potentiellen Anbietern
statt und wenn ja zu welhem Zeitpunkt in der Lieferante-
nauswahl?
4.1.3. Wie viele (potentielle) Anbieter stehen dem OEM zu folgen-
den Zeitpunkten in der Lieferantenauswahl zur Verfügung:
Konzeptphase (vor Entwiklung, Entwiklungswettbewerb),
während Entwiklung (Parallel Engineering), bei Ausshrei-
bung der Produktion, während der Produktion (Seond oder
Dual Souring) (Wie verteilen sih Aufgaben und Volumina
bei mehreren Anbietern gleihzeitig)
4.1.4. Baut der OEM alternative Lieferanten (wenn niht shon bei
einer einzigen Modellreihe) über vershiedene Modellreihen
auf?
4.1.5. In wieweit gibt es Vorteile aus wiederholter Zusammenarbeit
über vershiedene Projekte hinweg zwishen OEM und Liefer-
anten? Wie werden diese bei der Vergabe neuer Projekte
berüksihtigt?
4.1.6. In welher Reihenfolge werden Verhandlungen geführt (und
ggf. Verträge geshlossen)? Zuerst zwishen OEM und den
Systemlieferanten oder zuerst zwishen Systemlieferanten und
indirekten Teilelieferanten). Welhe Verträge werden zuletzt
geshlossen? Wer hat Ausstiegsmöglihkeiten, wann und zu
welhen Kosten? Wer bestimmt de Reihenfolge der Verhand-
lungen?
4.1.7. In welhem Umfang hat der OEM Einuÿ auf die Wahl der
indirekten Teilelieferanten durh die Systemlieferanten?
5. Entwiklung
5.1. Modellunspezishe Entwiklungen
5.1.1. Können Sie eine Vershiebung der Entwiklungsleistung vom
OEM zu System- oder Teilelieferanten feststellen? Wie
beurteilen Sie eine solhe Entwiklung, wo sehen Sie Vor- und
Nahteile?
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5.1.2. In wieweit shlieÿen sih Lieferanten untereinander oder mit
OEMs bzw. Systemlieferanten für über fahrzeugmodell-
spezishe Entwiklungsleistungen hinausgehende Forshung
zusammen?
5.1.3. Was sind die wihtigsten Vor- und Nahteile solher Kooper-
ationen?
5.1.4. Wie wirkt sih dies auf die Lieferantenauswahl und damit ggf.
auf Preise aus?
5.2. Modellspezishe Entwiklungen (Adaptionsentwiklungen)
5.2.1. Wie viel Entwiklungsaufwand (Zeit, Mann-Tage, EUR)
entsteht durh eine modellspezishe Anpassung (Entwik-
lung einer bereits prinzipiell bestehenden Tehnik in ein neues
Fahrzeugmodell)?
5.2.2. Welher Anteil am Entwiklungsaufwand wird vom Teileliefer-
anten, Systemlieferanten und dem OEM jeweils übernommen
(Wer entwikelt und wer trägt die anfallenden Kosten)?
5.2.3. Wer erhält typisherweise Patente an Entwiklungsleistun-
gen?
5.2.4. Wie werden die Aktivitäten der Beteiligten untereinander
koordiniert? Wer überwaht die Aktivitäten und deniert
Shnittstellen? Wer ist für den Erfolg verantwortlih?
5.2.5. Wie ndet bei Entwiklungen durh System- oder (direkten
oder indirekten) Teilelieferanten eine Koordination mit En-
twiklern anderer Bauteile statt?
5.2.6. In wieweit lassen sih Entwiklungserkenntnisse übertragen
und so eine Trennung von Entwiklung und Produktion er-
reihen? Welhen Anteil am gesamten Entwiklungsaufwand
(in Zeit, EUR) müsste bei einer Nah-Entwiklung neu aufge-
braht werden wenn Der Erstentwikler den Nahentwikler
mit allen vorhandenen Informationen unterstützt, nur eine
Übergabe von Zeihnungen und Prototypen erfolgt?
5.2.7. In wieweit kooperieren Sie auh mit direkten Wettbewer-
bern bei der Entwiklung von Bauteilen, z.B. um Gleihteilef-
fekte bei vershiedenen Fahrzeugen über Baureihen oder sogar
Marken hinweg zu nutzen?
5.2.8. Gibt es neben einer Entwiklung durh OEM oder Lieferanten
auh eine Entwiklung durh spezielle Entwiklungsrmen?
Wenn ja, wer nutzt solhe Firmen vor allem (OEM, System-
lieferant oder Teilelieferanten)? Was sind die Gründe für eine
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solhe Auslagerung von Entwiklungsleistung? Welher An-
teil an Entwiklungsleistungen wird dabei ausgelagert? Wie
verteilen sih dabei die Risiken, z.B. falls sih eine Entwik-
lung als fehlerhaft herausstellt?
6. Produktion
6.1. Produktionsentsheidungen
6.1.1. Auf welher Ebene der Zulieferhierarhie werden welhe
Entsheidungen getroen? (z.B. bezüglih Kapazitäten, Pro-
duktionsmengen und Losgröÿen)
6.1.2. Nutzt der Lieferant auh Produktionsmittel (Mashinen,
Werkzeuge oder auh Patente) des OEM bei der Produktion?
6.1.3. Rehnen die OEM mit (oder unternehmen die OEM etwas
gegen) drohende Insolvenzen der Systemlieferanten oder (di-
rekten und indirekten) Teilelieferanten? Wie hoh ist das jew-
eils zu erwartende Risiko?
6.2. Vertragsabweihungen und -strafen
6.2.1. Wie wollen Lieferanten und OEMs in Zukunft Qual-
itätssiherung betreiben, um kostspielige Rükrufaktionen zu
vermeiden, insb. vor dem Hintergrund einer Vershiebung
der Entwiklungsleistung vom OEM zu den System- oder
Teilelieferanten?
6.2.2. Wie und von wem werden Abweihungen von zuvor in
Verträgen spezizierten Kosten, Mengen oder Qualitäten fest-
gestellt? Wie sind entsprehende Strafen vertraglih aus-
gestaltet? Gibt es auÿervertraglihe Absprahen in dieser
Hinsiht?
6.2.3. Ist es möglih, Fehler im fertigen Produkt System- oder
Teilelieferanten zuzuweisen und gegebenenfalls entstehende
Zusatzkosten verursahungsgereht aufzuteilen? Ist es
möglih, Fehler des Systemlieferanten im Zusammenbau (im
Gegensatz zu den Fehlern der verbauten Einzelteile) des Sys-
tems/Moduls zu erkennen?
6.2.4. Wie häug sind im Nahhinein zu Tage tretende Missver-




2.6. Appendix: Questionnaire 41
7.1.1. Was wird in den Verträgen typisherweise wann speziziert?
Werden Mengen bereits beim ersten Angebot festgelegt (ins-
besondere vor der letzten Möglihkeit der Parteien, aus dem
Vertrag ohne Vertragsstrafen auszusteigen)?
7.1.2. Wie lange ist die typishe Vertragsdauer und wer legt sie fest?
7.1.3. Gibt es selbst noh während der Vertragslaufzeit Nahver-
handlungen? Unter welhen Bedingungen nden Nahver-
handlungen statt und wer veranlasst diese?
7.1.4. In wieweit wird die Weitergabe von F&E Ergebnis-
sen der Zulieferer an Konkurrenten des OEM vertraglih
eingeshränkt?
7.1.5. Welhe Absprahen werden neben den vertraglihen Regelun-
gen zwishen OEM und Systemlieferanten bzw. zwishen
System- und indirekten Teilelieferanten typisherweise noh
getroen (niht justitiable Absprahen)?
7.2. Anreizstrukturen und Kostenteilung
7.2.1. In welher Form und Höhe sind Lieferverträge Performane-
abhängig (Zielerfüllung hinsihtlih Qualität und Menge)?
Gibt es Untershiede zwishen den vershiedenen Lieferan-
tenebenen?
7.2.2. In wieweit werden die Kosten für Investitionen des Lieferan-
ten vom OEM (bzw. bei indirekten Teilelieferanten vom Sys-
temlieferanten) übernommen, z.B. für Entwiklungen oder für
Mashinen und Werkzeuge?
7.2.3. Wie erfolgt in diesem Fall eine Übernahme der Kosten (direkte
Bezahlung, Umshlag auf eine festgelegte Produktionsmenge,
et.)?
7.2.4. Wie wirkt sih eine Kostenübernahme auf die Eigentum-
srehte, z.B. an Patenten oder Mashinen und Werkzeugen,
aus?
8. Informationen
8.1.1. Welhe Informationen hat ein Geshäftspartner (besonders
der OEM) über die Produktionskosten der anderen Part-
ner (System- und Teilelieferanten)? In wieweit geben Un-
tershiede zwishen alten und neuen Produktmodellen oder
Baureihen Anhaltspunkte hierfür?
8.1.2. Hat der Systemlieferant bessere Informationen über die
Kostenstruktur der indirekten Teilelieferanten als der OEM?
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8.1.3. Kann der OEM Informationen oder Vermutungen über die
Kosten des Systemlieferanten aus den Verhandlungen mit dem
indirekten Teilelieferanten ableiten (falls solhe stattnden)?
8.1.4. Wie exibel sind Ihre eigenen Informations- und Kostenreh-
nungssysteme, um vershiedene Vertragskonstellationen abzu-
bilden?
8.1.5. Sind die Verträge zwishen System- und indirekten Teileliefer-
anten dem OEM bekannt? Wenn ja, welhe Elemente (z.B.
Preis, Menge, Qualität, Zusammenarbeit in der Forshung)?
Kann der OEM Verträge, die er selbst shlieÿt, daran
knüpfen?
8.1.6. Sind die Verträge zwishen dem OEM und Systemlieferan-
ten dem indirekten Teilelieferanten bekannt? Kann es z.B.
sein, dass der OEM direkt mit dem Teilelieferanten verhan-
delt und Daten aus dem Vertrag mit dem Systemlieferanten
weitergibt?




1.1.1. Was sind Ihre strategishen Ziele im Einkauf für die Zukunft?
(z.B. verstärktes Outsouring, Know-how Fokussierung, mehr
oder weniger Zusammenarbeit mit Systemlieferanten)
1.1.2. Welhe Produkte (Systeme, Module oder Teile) bzw. Pro-
duktgruppen werden von Ihnen von welhen Lieferanten
eingekauft? Wie ist Ihre Einkaufsorganisation aufgebaut?
(Weitere Details vgl. Kap. 3)
1.1.3. Ist hierbei der Einkauf von einem System- oder Teileliefer-
anten von Beginn an festgelegt oder entsheidet sih dies im
Laufe der Entwiklung? Wann entsheidet sih dies im let-
ztern Fall typisherweise?
1.2. Wertshöpfung
1.2.1. Welhen Wertanteil am Fahrzeug haben die eingekauften Pro-
dukte? Was ist der durhshnittlihe Materialkostenanteil,
Ihre Wertshöpfung und die Marge je Fahrzeug?
1.2.2. Welher Anteil der Wertshöpfung wird vom Systemlieferan-
ten, welher von dem (den) Teilelieferanten geshaen?
1.2.3. Erfahren Sie für Module/Systeme höhere oder niedrigere
Eonomies of Sale relativ zu Einzelbauteilen? In welher
Gröÿenordnung bewegen sih diese (Verdopplung der Einkauf-
menge führt zu x Prozent Einsparungen)? In wieweit beziehen
diese sih auf die Produktion (Lernkurveneekte) oder auf
Einkaufserfolge (Einkaufs-Eonomies of Sale)?
1.3. Tehnologie und Innovation
1.3.1. Wie komplex sind die betrahteten, von Ihnen eingekauften
Produkte (System, Modul oder Teil)? Sind alle Tehnologien
zur Herstellung dieser Produkte allgemein bekannt? Bestehen
Patentrehte auf Systeme, Module oder einzelne Teile?
1.3.2. Wie beurteilen Sie die tehnologishe Entwiklung der letzten
5 Jahre im Umfeld der von Ihnen eingekauften Produkte (ins-
besondere vor dem Hintergrund einer stärkeren Fokussierung
auf Fahrzeugelektronik und Soft- gegenüber Hardware)?
1.3.3. Wie spezish für ein bestimmtes Fahrzeugmodell oder einen
OEM sind die Produkte, in der Entwiklung und in der Pro-
duktion?
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1.3.4. Wie komplex sind die Shnittstellen (Entwiklung und Ein-
bau) zum restlihen Fahrzeug (Umfang des Lastenhefts, In-
teraktion mit anderen Bauteilen/Systemen)?
1.3.5. Wie lang sind die Innovationszyklen in den von Ihnen
eingekauften Produkten? Wie lange dauert es erfahrungs-
gemäÿ, bis eine Innovation auf dem Markt ersheint?
1.3.6. Beshleunigt oder bremst die Vergabe von Modulen/Systemen
an Systemlieferanten die Zeit zwishen Entwiklung und
Markteinführung eines Fahrzeugs im Vergleih zur Eigenen-
twiklung (durh den OEM)?
2. Kunden
2.1.1. Welhe anderen Unternehmen (OEM) werden vom selben
Lieferanten mit dem betrahteten oder einem vergleihbaren
Produkt beliefert? Welhe OEM kaufen bei anderen Liefer-
anten ein oder stellen das betrahtete Produkt selbst her?
2.1.2. Welhe anderen Produkte beziehen Sie noh vom selben
Lieferanten? In wiefern wird die Lieferung vershiedener Pro-
dukte (z.B. über Baureihen) oder Projektbündel gemeinsam
verhandelt oder bestehen Rahmenverträge?
2.1.3. Welhe strategishen Implikationen ergeben sih aus Ihrer
Siht aus der Verbreiterung der Produktpalette durh
Fahrzeughersteller, z.B. durh die BMW 1er- und X-Serie,
den Porshe Cayenne oder die Meredes A-Klasse bzw. den
Maybah? Wie denken Sie wird dies von den Konsumenten
beurteilt?
2.1.4. Wie beurteilen Sie die Bedeutung der Produktein-
führungszeiten? Läÿt sih eine Tendenz zu kürzeren
Produkteinführungszeiten oder -lebenszyklen feststellen und
wie wirkt sih diese aus?
2.1.5. Hat sih aus Ihrer Siht der Wettbewerb zwishen den OEMs
erhöht? Was sind Ursahen hierfür (z.B. stagnierende Absatz-
zahlen, Überkapazitäten, et.)? Wie hat sih dies gegebenen-
falls auf Sie ausgewirkt?
3. Anbieter (im gleihen Produktmarkt)
3.1. Marktstruktur
3.1.1. Wie groÿ ist der Markt für die von Ihnen eingekauften Pro-
dukte in Deutshland, Europa, weltweit: Wie viel Umsatz
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wird mit diesen Produkten p.a. erzielt? Wie viel Stük wer-
den umgesetzt?
3.1.2. Wie viele potentielle Lieferanten stehen Ihnen für die von Ih-
nen eingekauften Produkte zur Verfügung? Mit welhen un-
terhalten Sie Lieferbeziehungen?
3.1.3. Wie verteilen sih die Marktanteile unter den angesprohenen
Wettbewerbern?
3.1.4. In welhem Umfang hängt die Anzahl der Stufen in der Liefer-
antenhierarhie ab von der Innovationsfrequenz im betra-
hteten Markt, der Komplexität des betrahteten Produkts,
der Volatilität der Nahfrage nah dem Produkt, dem Wet-
tbewerb im entsprehenden Produktmarkt oder im Fahrzeug-
markt allgemein?
3.2. Anbietereigenshaften
3.2.1. Gibt es tehnologishe Untershiede zwishen den vershiede-
nen System - oder Teilelieferanten im Markt der von Ihnen
eingekauften Produkte?
3.2.2. Welhe Informationen haben Sie über Tehnologie und
Kostenstrukturen der Lieferanten?
3.2.3. Was ist die typishe Eigentümerstruktur eines System- und
eines Teilelieferanten: Welhe Eigentümer und Gesellshafts-
form existiert, in wieweit sind Tohterunternehmen und
Beteiligungen vorhanden?
3.2.4. In wieweit hat aus Ihrer Siht die Entwiklung und Stärkung
einer eigenen Zulieferer-Marke, z.B. durh Bosh, Einuÿ auf
den Wettbewerb unter Zulieferern? Wie beurteilen Sie als
OEM den Aufbau einer Zulieferer-Marke?
3.3. Globalisierung
3.3.1. Welhen Einuss hat aus Ihrer Siht die Globalisierung der
Industrie (sowohl der OEM als auh der Zulieferer) auf den
Wettbewerb?
3.3.2. In welher Form und weshalb verfolgen Sie heute und in der
Zukunft eine Globalisierungsstrategie (Zentrale Produktion
(High Teh vs. Low ost) und weltweiter Vertrieb vs. lokale
Produktion und Vertrieb)?
3.3.3. In wieweit erfolgt eine Produktionsverlagerung gemeinsam
mit System- oder Teilelieferanten oder OEMs? Wer führt die
Initiative an? In wieweit unterstützen Sie Ihre Lieferanten,
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z.B. nanziell? In wieweit unterstützen Lieferanten ihre Un-
terlieferanten bei einer Produktionsverlagerung?
3.3.4. In welhem Umfang führt eine Globalisierung der Produk-
tion zu einem verstärkten Wettbewerbsdruk auf Seiten der
System- oder Teilelieferanten, z.B. über Seond Souring?
4. Anbieterauswahl
4.1.1. Wie beurteilen Sie die Auslagerung der Herstellung von
ganzen Systemen oder Modulen zu sog. System- oder Mod-
ullieferanten und damit die Entwiklung von mehrstugen
Zulieferhierarhien? Worin sehen Sie Vor- und Nahteile einer
solhen Entwiklung?
4.1.2. Was sind die wihtigsten Shritte in der Lieferantenauswahl?
Findet eine Auktion (Entwiklung und Produktion) zwishen
vershiedenen potentiellen Anbietern statt und wenn ja zu
welhem Zeitpunkt in der Lieferantenauswahl?
4.1.3. Wie viele potentielle Geshäftspartner im Systemlieferanten-
und (direkten oder indirekten) Teilelieferantenlevel stehen Ih-
nen typisherweise während der folgenden Phasen zur Verfü-
gung? Konzeptphase (vor Entwiklung, Entwiklungswettbe-
werb), während Entwiklung (Parallel Engineering), bei Auss-
hreibung der Produktion, während der Produktion (Seond
oder Dual Souring) (Wie verteilen sih Aufgaben und Volu-
mina bei mehreren Anbietern gleihzeitig)
4.1.4. Bauen Sie alternative Lieferanten (wenn niht shon bei einer
einzigen Modellreihe) über vershiedene Modellreihen auf?
4.1.5. In wieweit gibt es Vorteile aus wiederholter Zusammenarbeit
mit einem bestimmten Lieferanten über vershiedene Projekte
hinweg? Wie werden diese bei der Vergabe neuer Projekte
berüksihtigt?
4.1.6. In welher Reihenfolge werden Verhandlungen geführt (und
ggf. Verträge geshlossen)? Zuerst zwishen Ihnen und den
Systemlieferanten oder zuerst zwishen Systemlieferanten und
indirekten Teilelieferanten?. Welhe Verträge werden zuletzt
geshlossen? Wer hat Ausstiegsmöglihkeiten, wann und zu
welhen Kosten? Wer bestimmt de Reihenfolge der Verhand-
lungen?
4.1.7. In welhem Umfang haben Sie Einuÿ auf die Wahl der in-
direkten Teilelieferanten durh einen Systemlieferanten (sog.
Direted Business)?
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5. Entwiklung
5.1. Modellunspezishe Entwiklungen
5.1.1. Können Sie eine Vershiebung der Entwiklungsleistung (vom
OEM) zu System- oder Teilelieferanten feststellen? Wie
beurteilen Sie eine solhe Entwiklung, wo sehen Sie Vor- und
Nahteile?
5.1.2. In wieweit shlieÿen sih Lieferanten untereinander oder
mit Systemlieferanten oder Ihnen als OEM für über
fahrzeugmodellspezishe Entwiklungsleistungen hinausge-
hende Forshung zusammen?
5.1.3. Was sind die wihtigsten Vor- und Nahteile solher Kooper-
ationen?
5.1.4. Wie wirkt sih dies auf die Lieferantenauswahl und damit ggf.
auf Preise aus?
5.2. Modellspezishe Entwiklungen (Adaptionsentwiklungen)
5.2.1. Wie viel Entwiklungsaufwand (Zeit, Mann-Tage, EUR) fällt
für ein neues Fahrzeugmodell insgesamt an? Wie teilt sih
dieser Aufwand zwishen Grundlagen- und Adaptionsentwik-
lungen auf? Wie verhält sih dies für einzelne exemplarishe
(eingekaufte) Teile?
5.2.2. Welher Anteil am Entwiklungsaufwand wird vom Teileliefer-
anten, Systemlieferanten und Ihnen als OEM jeweils über-
nommen (Wer entwikelt und wer trägt die anfallenden
Kosten)?
5.2.3. Wer erhält typisherweise Patente an Entwiklungsleistun-
gen?
5.2.4. Wie werden die Aktivitäten der Beteiligten untereinander
koordiniert? Wer überwaht die Aktivitäten und deniert
Shnittstellen? Wer ist für den Erfolg verantwortlih?
5.2.5. Wie ndet bei Entwiklungen durh System- oder (direkten
oder indirekten) Teilelieferanten eine Koordination mit En-
twiklern anderer Bauteile statt?
5.2.6. In wieweit lassen sih Entwiklungserkenntnisse übertragen
und so eine Trennung von Entwiklung und Produktion er-
reihen? Welhen Anteil am gesamten Entwiklungsaufwand
(in Zeit, EUR) müsste bei einer Nah-Entwiklung neu aufge-
braht werden wenn Der Erstentwikler den Nahentwikler
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mit allen vorhandenen Informationen unterstützt, Nur eine
Übergabe von Zeihnungen und Prototypen erfolgt
5.2.7. In wieweit kooperieren Sie auh mit Wettbewerbern oder
Lieferanten von Wettbewerbern bei der Entwiklung von
Bauteilen, z.B. um Gleihteileekte bei vershiedenen
Fahrzeugen über Baureihen oder sogar Marken hinweg zu
nutzen?
5.2.8. Gibt es neben einer Entwiklung durh OEM oder Lieferanten
auh eine Entwiklung durh spezielle Entwiklungsrmen?
Wenn ja, wer nutzt solhe Firmen vor Allem (OEM, System-
lieferant oder Teilelieferanten)? Was sind die Gründe für eine
solhe Auslagerung von Entwiklungsleistung? Welher An-
teil an Entwiklungsleistungen wird dabei ausgelagert? Wie
verteilen sih dabei die Risiken, z.B. falls sih eine Entwik-
lung als fehlerhaft herausstellt?
6. Produktion
6.1. Produktionsentsheidungen
6.1.1. Auf welher Ebene (OEM, Systemlieferant, Teilelieferant)
werden welhe Entsheidungen getroen? (z.B. bezüglih Ka-
pazitäten, Produktionsmengen und Losgröÿen)
6.1.2. Nutzen Lieferanten auh Ihre Produktionsmittel (Mashinen,
Werkzeuge oder auh Patente) oder die von Systemlieferan-
ten?
6.1.3. Rehnen Sie mit (oder unternehmen Sie etwas gegen) dro-
hende Insolvenzen der Systemlieferanten oder (direkten und
indirekten) Teilelieferanten? Wie hoh ist das jeweils zu er-
wartende Risiko?
6.2. Vertragsabweihungen und -strafen
6.2.1. Wie wollen Sie und Ihre Lieferanten in Zukunft Qual-
itätssiherung betreiben, um kostspielige Rükrufaktionen zu
vermeiden, insb. vor dem Hintergrund einer Vershiebung
der Entwiklungsleistung vom OEM zu den System- oder
Teilelieferanten?
6.2.2. Wie und von wem werden Abweihungen von zuvor in
Verträgen spezizierten Kosten, Mengen oder Qualitäten fest-
gestellt? Wie sind entsprehende Strafen vertraglih aus-
gestaltet? Gibt es auÿervertraglihe Absprahen in dieser
Hinsiht?
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6.2.3. Ist es möglih, Fehler im fertigen Produkt System- oder
Teilelieferanten zuzuweisen und gegebenenfalls entstehende
Zusatzkosten verursahungsgereht aufzuteilen? Ist es
möglih, Fehler des Systemlieferanten im Zusammenbau (im
Gegensatz zu den Fehlern der verbauten Einzelteile) des Sys-
tems/Moduls zu erkennen?
6.2.4. Wie häug sind im Nahhinein zu Tage tretende Missver-




7.1.1. Was wird in den Verträgen typisherweise wann speziziert?
Werden Mengen bereits beim ersten Angebot festgelegt (ins-
besondere vor der letzten Möglihkeit der Parteien, aus dem
Vertrag ohne Vertragsstrafen auszusteigen)?
7.1.2. Wie lange ist die typishe Vertragsdauer und wer legt sie fest?
7.1.3. Gibt es selbst noh während der Vertragslaufzeit Nahver-
handlungen? Unter welhen Bedingungen nden Nahver-
handlungen statt und wer veranlasst diese?
7.1.4. In wieweit wird die Weitergabe von F& E Ergebnissen der
System- oder Teilelieferanten an andere OEM vertraglih
eingeshränkt?
7.1.5. Welhe Absprahen werden neben den vertraglihen Regelun-
gen zwishen Ihnen und Systemlieferanten bzw. zwishen
System- und indirekten Teilelieferanten typisherweise noh
getroen (niht justitiable Absprahen)?
7.2. Anreizstrukturen und Kostenteilung
7.2.1. Hängen die Gewinne der Firmen, die direkt an Sie liefern,
stärker von ihrer Performane (Zielerfüllung hinsihtlih
Qualität und Menge) ab? Beinhalten z.B. die Verträge zwis-
hen Ihnen und Systemlieferanten einen höheren paushalen
Anteil und die Verträge zwishen System- und indirekten
Teilelieferanten einen höheren produktionsmengenabhängigen
Anteil?
7.2.2. In wieweit werden die Kosten für Investitionen der Sys-
temlieferanten oder Teilelieferanten von Ihnen übernom-
men, z.B. für Entwiklungen oder für Mashinen und
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Werkzeuge? Übernehmen Systemlieferanten solhe Kosten
bei den Teilelieferanten?
7.2.3. Wie erfolgt in diesem Fall eine Übernahme der Kosten (direkte
Bezahlung, Umshlag auf eine festgelegte Produktionsmenge,
et.)?
7.2.4. Wie wirkt sih eine Kostenübernahme auf die Eigentum-
srehte, z.B. an Patenten oder Mashinen und Werkzeugen,
aus?
8. Informationen
8.1.1. Welhe Informationen haben Sie über die Produktionskosten
und Gewinne Ihrer Geshäftspartner (System- und indirek-
ten Teilelieferanten)? In wieweit geben Untershiede zwis-
hen alten und neuen Produktmodellen oder Baureihen An-
haltspunkte hierfür?
8.1.2. Hat der Systemlieferant bessere Informationen über die
Kostenstruktur der indirekten Teilelieferanten als Sie?
8.1.3. Können Sie Informationen/Vermutungen über die Kosten des
Systemlieferanten aus den Verhandlungen mit dem indirekten
Teilelieferanten ableiten (falls solhe stattnden)?
8.1.4. Werden von System- oder Teilelieferanten Preismenüs (z.B.
vershiedene Möglihkeiten der Kompensation von Entwik-
lungskosten) angeboten? Wie transparent sind diese Kalku-
lationen?
8.1.5. Sind Ihnen die Verträge zwishen System- und indirekten
Teilelieferanten bekannt? Wenn ja, welhe Elemente (z.B.
Preis, Menge, Qualität, Zusammenarbeit in der Forshung)?
Können Sie Verträge, die Sie selbst shlieÿen, daran knüpfen?
8.1.6. Sind die Verträge zwishen Ihnen und dem Systemlieferanten
den indirekten Teilelieferanten bekannt? Kann es z.B. sein,
dass Sie direkt mit dem Teilelieferanten verhandeln und Daten
aus dem Vertrag mit dem Systemlieferanten weitergeben?
3. ASYMMETRIC PROCUREMENT MECHANISMS
52 Chapter 3. Asymmetri Prourement Me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3.1 Introdution
3.1.1 Motivation
The automotive industries in Europe, North Ameria and Asia are faing
similar tasks and inentives in their prourement proess. Indeed they pro-
ure omparable parts with lots in the same order of magnitude. Yet the
pattern of prourement evolved dierently in large parts. At rst glane,
the Asian ar produers largely engaged in a protetive long term ontrat
model. Alike forms exist throughout many eonomies of East Asia. As Dyer
(1996) showed, a key element of this system is strategi development of the
suppliers to build mutual knowledge of the prodution proesses and shared
prot from the ahieved benets of ooperation. Other evidene suggests
a downside interpretation, with highly demanding ar produers, exerising
high pressure onto the suppliers without using the market. The European
and North Amerian ar industry instead relied on frequent ompetitive au-
tions amongst potential suppliers in the quest for extrating benets from
ontrating with the most eient supplier.
While this dierene may largely be rooted in industry history and busi-
ness ulture, one should ask whether there are deeper trade-os between the
two prourement mehanisms and what fators drive the deision amongst
them. This question takes on further importane by the observations of
Liker and Choi (2004), that western ar produers reently try to imitate
their Asian ounterparts.
In general the prourer needs to balane the trade-o between setting
the right inentives for an inumbent to invest in relationship-spei in-
vestments on the one hand and exerting ompetitive pressure in order to
prot from ompetitively bid down prourement pries on the other hand.
As Hahn, Kim, and Kim (1986) already point out, these goals are onit-
ing as higher ompetitive pressure and thus a higher probability of losing
the inumbeny status lowers the inentive of the inumbent to invest. We
will analyze this trade-o in a theoretial model and subsequently we will
return to an empirial ase study on the automotive industry to qualify our
results. Moreover we will use results from the ase study to derive the model
struture and some assumptions.
3.1.2 Existing work
Laont and Tirole (1988) address this problem in a two period model with
an inumbent investing in the rst period to lower his prodution ost in the
seond period, in whih he ompetes with a potential entrant. They show
that in the resulting asymmetri aution the prourer should favor the weaker
3.1. Introdution 53
(higher ost) rm, if the investment of the inumbent is not transferable to
the entrant. These results are obtained with an objetive funtion from the
view of a regulator, whih might dier from prot maximizing behavior of a
rm.
Dasgupta (1990), Tan (1992), and Bag (1997) build onto this two-period
model and introdue ompetition at the investment stage. As the invest-
ment an be undertaken by all ontestants, it takes the shape of general
R&D expenses rather than relationship-spei investments. They examine
underinvestment with symmetri rms under several aution formats par-
tially with reserve pries and entry fees. Arozamena and Cantillon (2004)
show underinvestment in the rst prie autions if only one rm has the
option to invest and investments are observable to the other rms.
Aknowledging the rare use of entry fees in pratie, Bag (1997) gives also
an example where a bid-disriminating seond-prie aution performs bet-
ter than both fair rst- and seond prie autions under endogenous invest-
ment deisions. The example suggest disrimination in favor of the stronger
(lower ost after investment) rm as this indues higher inentives to invest.
This disrimination stands in ontrast to the results of previous researh by
MAfee and MMillan (1989) and Laont and Tirole (1988). The result of
MAfee and MMillan (1989) in the ontext of international trade is driven
by exogenous dierenes in ost distributions rather than endogenous dif-
ferenes due to investments. In the work of Laont and Tirole (1988) the
advantage of the investment, if it is non-transferable, arues solely to the
inumbent and improves his ost position in the seond period, suh that the
weaker rm should be favored by the prourer.
3.1.3 This ontribution
We analyze an innitely repeated prourement setting for an indivisible prod-
ut from the view of a prourer. He an hoose to either award the ontrat
again to the inumbent of the previous period or to one out of several en-
trants. The suppliers are symmetri but for the inumbent's ability to invest
in relationship spei assets before the tender proedure. The investment
struture is most similar to the one in Arozamena and Cantillon (2004). The
investment advantage of the inumbent an be reinterpreted as swithing
ost (i.e. ost disadvantage on the side of the potential entrant), whih are
sizable, as Greenstein (1995, 1993) shows, and an typially to a large extent
be inuened by the inumbent supplier. We are interested in the eets of
repeated transations, but unlike Laont and Tirole (1988) we onsider in-
nitely repeated interations to abstrat from last round eets, whih ould
arise in a two-period model. We model advantages that the prourer might
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want to grant to the inumbent via the prourer's option to use a more or
less asymmetri sequential prourement mehanism.
We ompare two spei prourement mehanisms, whih are derived
from stylized fats of existing prourement proesses from the ase study re-
sults. They dier in the timing of events and thus the prourer's information
struture:
In the Competitive Mehanism, the prourer rst soliits bids
from the ompetitive group of entrants to learn about his best
alternative option, before hallenging his previous inumbent to
math the entrants' best oer.
1
In the Protetive Mehanism on the other hand, the prourer
makes a posted prie oer to the inumbent and refrains from
the aution and the resulting information in the rst plae. He
only uses the market, if the inumbent delines the oer in order
to searh the entrants for an alternative supplier.
To see the information and timing aspet of the two mehanisms more
learly we need to stress that negotiations generially onsist of two steps:
rst the prourer generates an option, on whih he deides in a seond step.
These two steps an be hronologially separated. In the Competitive Meh-
anism the option generation with the entrants takes plae in the beginning,
but the prourer's deision is delayed until he makes the oer to the inum-
bent. This improves the prourer's information about his alternative option
and thus his bargaining position, when negotiating with the inumbent as
ompared to the Protetive Mehanism. Here the prourer generates the op-
tion with the inumbent in the beginning and immediately deides on this
option before eventually entering option generation with the entrants, suh
that the negotiation with the inumbent an not improve his bargaining po-
sition anymore.
We rst solve for the equilibria in both mehanisms. Subsequently, we
analyze the superiority of the mehanisms. We single out the analysis of bids
and of the investment levels. Afterwards we ombine all eets and disuss
the prourer's hoie of one of the mehanisms depending on properties of
the investment.
We nd the Competitive Mehanism to be superior onerning the result-
ing payments to the prourer, supporting the intuition, that CM exerises
1
The oer made to the inumbent needs not to be exatly equal the entrant's oer.
It an be hosen freely by the prourer, but it may ondition on the best entrant's bid,
whih will be optimal.
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higher market pressure via the better information position of the prourer.
Conerning investment the superiority results are mixed: For low investment
ost, CM also indues the higher investment. Else, PM indues higher invest-
ments, but is limited in the absolute maximum level. In the total omparison,
we show by the use of examples in the investment ost spae, that none of
the mehanisms is generally superior.
Our analysis touhes three main eonomi problems: First, the hold-
up problem due to the investment that binds the buyer to the inumbent.
Seond, the asymmetri information problem onerning the prodution ost
and thus the problem of the buyer to eliit this information via an aution.
And third, the relevane of innite repetition and the inuene of future
periods on the behavior in the period in question.
3.1.4 Organization of the paper
The main part of the paper is organized as follows. In setion 3.2 we introdue
the two mehanisms to be ompared and solve for the equilibria in setion
3.3. In setion 3.4 we ompare the two mehanisms and obtain the main
results. Before we onlude in the last setion, we qualify our results against
ase study observations and suggest some extensions.
3.2 The Model
The model features three types of players: One prouring rm P, one in-
umbent supplier I and N ≥ 2 entrant suppliers E1,. . . ,EN , with a generi
entrant Ej. Players interat in every period of a repeated stage game. In
every period, P needs to proure exatly one unit of an indivisible good, to
whih he attahes value w, high enough to make prourement eient at all
prodution osts. w is assumed to be ommon knowledge. Eah supplier
has private information about his prodution ost cEj (cI respetively) for
the good. In order to make omputations and results better omparable to
those in standard aution theory and monopoly theory, we introdue the
suppliers' types θEj = w − cEj (θI = w − cI respetively) as the suppliers'
valuation for the prourement ontrat. Thus θEj desribes the total benets
of ooperation between the prourer and a spei supplier Ej and is private
information to this supplier. This allows us to interpret the prourer as seller
of a prourement ontrat and the suppliers as potential buyers, suh that we
an analyze the problem in a standard sales setting. We normalize the types
θ on the support [0, 1] and assume them to be independently distributed
aording to a distribution F (·).
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Conerning the tender of the ontrat, we will ompare two dierent pro-
urement mehanisms for the stage game. Both feature a simultaneous rst-
prie aution amongst the entrant suppliers and an oer from the prourer
to the inumbent supplier. They dier in the order in whih the aution and
the oer to the entrant take plae and at whih point in time the prourer
makes a deision to hoose one supplier. Consequently they also display a
dierent information struture. We explain the dierenes of the mehanisms
in detail in setions 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 after presenting further ommonalities.
We all entrant Ej's bids for the prourement ontrat in the aution
BEj and the oer made to the inumbent BI , hene if the ontrat is sold
and all payments for the ontrat as well as for the prourement transation
are made, the supplier gets a payo of w − cEj − BEj = θEj − BEj (or
w − cI − BI = θI − BI respetively) and the prourer obtains the bid BEj
(or BI). Like in the normal sales setting, the seller doesn't know about the
valuation of the buyers, the buyers bid for resulting payments to the seller,
the winning buyers gets a payo of his valuation minus his bid, and the seller
lets the highest bidder win.
We assume all suppliers to be symmetri up to the inumbent having the
possibility to make a relationship-spei investment i ∈ R+ at ost C(i) at
the beginning of eah stage game. Note that the identity of the inumbent
is endogenous in the repeated game. The investment generates an additional
value of i to the prourer if he awards the ontrat to the inumbent again
in the urrent period.
2
All ations are observable. In partiular, we assume that the entrants
know the investment hoie of the inumbent when bidding in an aution.
3
Thus we get the following ex-post payos for the one period stage game
2
In reality, relationship-spei investments benet typially the prourer as well as
the inumbent. As the prourer observes the benets of the investment, it doesn't matter,
whether they arue to the inumbent or the prourer. The prourer has always the pos-
sibility to post a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the inumbent that eliits the total observable
benet.
3
This model ts an industry that is established and onentrated enough to allow
for this assumption. Prouring for a non-ommodity, speialized good, that inorporates
sizable inumbeny advantages, is typially done in a very narrow market with rih infor-
mation ows between the players. Dropping this assumption and introduing beliefs about
the investment gives us multiple equilibria. One belief system entails orret presumptions
and ontains the equilibrium onsidered here.
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to the inumbent, the entrants and the prourer:
uI =
{
−C(i) + θI −BI if P sells to inumbent I
−C(i) if P sells to an entrant
uEj =
{




BI + i if P sells to inumbent I
BEj if P sells to entrant Ej
We employ Markov perfet equilibrium as solution onept to the re-
peated game.
As motivated above, we an now explain the dierenes in the two pro-
urement mehanisms within the stage game, before getting to the repetition
of the stage game, whih onludes the model desription of the game we are
to analyze in the subsequent setions.
3.2.1 Competitive Mehanism (CM)
In the Competitive Mehanism (CM), the prourer rst holds an aution
amongst the entrants and then issues an oer to the inumbent. Thus we
have the resulting timing as follows:
(1) The inumbent hooses an investment i ∈ R+ at ost C(i).
(2) Nature draws the valuations of this period's prourement ontrat for
all suppliers as private information θI , θE1, . . . , θEN .
(3) The prourer initiates a rst-prie aution amongst the entrants E1,. . . ,
EN in whih they submit bids BE1, . . . , BEN ∈ R+. The winner of
this aution obtains the ontratand has to pay his bidonly if the
inumbent rejets a take-it-or-leave-it oer from the prourer in step
(4).
(4) The prourer, knowing the bids of the entrants, issues a take-it-or-
leave-it oer BI to the inumbent. The inumbent aepts (d = 1) or
rejets (d = 0).
The ompetitive mehanism is haraterized by the prourer trying to
exeute as muh diret pressure on the inumbent as possible by rst inves-
tigating what alternative option he an get from the entrants and then using
this information against the inumbent. This mehanism is derived from the
pratie of European and North Amerian ar produers.
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3.2.2 Protetive Mehanism (PM)
On the other hand, we have the protetive mehanism (PM). Here the key
dierene is that P forgoes learning his atual outside option before making
a (binding) oer to I. This is modelled by interhanging the order of the
aution in step 3 and the take-it-or-leave-it oer in step 4. Only if the the
oer to I is delined, an aution amongst the entrants takes plae. The payo
funtions and the assumptions remain the same. Thus we get the following
timing for PM:
(1) The inumbent hooses an investment i ∈ R+ at ost C(i).
(2) Nature draws the valuations of this period's prourement ontrat for
all suppliers as private information θI , θE1, . . . , θEN
(3) The prourer issues a take-it-or-leave-it oer BI to the inumbent. The
inumbent aepts (d = 1) or rejets (d = 0).
(4) Only if the inumbent rejets, the prourer initiates a rst-prie aution
amongst the entrants E1,. . . , EN in whih they submit bids BE1, . . . ,
BEN ∈ R+. The winner of this aution obtains then the ontrat.
The protetive mehanism is haraterized by the prourer granting in-
umbeny advantages to the inumbent and trying to exeute not so muh
diret pressure. By ommitting to delay the searh for an alternative op-
tion, the prourer relieves diret market pressure from the inumbent and
makes the inumbeny status more valuable, whih exeutes indiret market
pressure via the threat of losing the inumbeny. This mehanism is derived
from the pratie of Asian ar produers as well as from the pratie of highly
innovative European premium ar produers in the ase study.
3.2.3 Repetition of the stage game
We extend these stage games into an innitely repeated game, in order to
exlude last period eets.
4
All players disount future periods with a om-
mon disount fator δ ∈ (0, 1). Types are independently drawn eah period
for eah supplier. The analysis of type-orrelations over time in the repeated
game is not overed in this paper and an be worthwhile to examine in a
separate eort.
We do not allow for swithing mehanisms between periods. This is to
apture long lasting and reliable industry standards that predominate in
4
Due to the formulation with ontinuation values, this model an be extended to a
nitely repeated version of the game with last period eets.
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the industry-wide supply struture for one spei produt. So in order to
ompare the two models we let the prourer announe upfront one or the
other model.
We adopt Markov Perfet Equilibrium (f. Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000) as
solution onept, suh that all future payos beyond the payo of the urrent
stage game an be expressed using ontinuation values. These depend only on
the payo relevant information of the urrent period for future periods, the so
alled exit state. The state in this model an be aptured in one variable and
is the identity of the winner of the ontrat, i.e. the inumbent in the next
period. We denote the ontinuation value of the next period's inumbent
and entrants by VI and VE respetively. The prourer's ontinuation value is
VP .
Thus, payos of the repeated game for inumbent I, an entrant Ej, and
prourer P are as follows:
UI =
{
−C(i) + θI −BI + δVI if I wins, i.e. d = 1
−C(i) + δVE if an entrant wins, i.e. d = 0
UEj =
{
θEj −BEj + δVI if Ej wins, i.e. d = 0 and BEj is highest bid
0 + δVE otherwise
UP =
{
BI + i+ δVP if I wins, i.e. d = 1
BEj + δVP if Ej wins, i.e. d = 0 and BEj is highest bid
with the ontinuation values being VP = E[UP ], VI = E[UI ] and VE =
E[UE]. The ontinuation values apture the disounted expeted stream of
future payos if the players enter the next period in the roles that are speied
by the exit state of the urrent period. Thus δ(VI − VE) is the advantage of
being the next period's inumbent disounted to the urrent period.
In the repeated game, all players maximize their disounted stream of
urrent and future prots. For Markov perfet equilibria, the analysis of the
innitely repeated game ollapses to the analysis of a steady state in the
stage game with ontinuation values. Due to the information struture of
the game, we an use a bakward indution proedure to solve for equilibria
of the full game. Thus, an equilibrium in both mehanisms is dened by
a tuple (i∗, B∗Ej, B
∗
I , d





optimization problems ondition on the observed ations of the preeding
steps, whih are dierent for CM and PM aording to the timing.
In the following analysis, it will be helpful to have expressions for the
bids of the entrants and the oer to the inumbent net of the inumbeny
advantage. Therefore we introdue the notation bI := BI − δ(VI − VE) and
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bEj := BEj−δ(VI−VE).
5
In the upoming setions we will use either notation
for bids aording to the ease of reading.
3.3 Equilibria
In this setion we derive the equilibria of the two mehanisms before we get to
the omparison results in the next setion. We provide interpretations mostly
in the results setion to keep this disussion short and avoid unneessary
repetitions.
In order to derive the equilibria of both mehanisms, we rst need some
regularity assumptions on the distribution of the suppliers' valuations F (θ).
Assumption 1: F (θ) is thrie ontinuously dierentiable with stritly positive
density funtion f(θ) on the support [0, 1]. The hazard rate h(θ) := f(θ)/(1−
F (θ)) of F (θ) is inreasing and the reverse hazard rate r(θ) := f(θ)/F (θ) of
F (θ) is dereasing.
Assumption 1 is valid throughout the whole analysis. We will add other
assumptions where needed in the ourse of the disussion. These will be
purely tehnial and do not allow for an ostensive desription of the dis-
tributions that fulll the assumptions. The uniform distribution of types
F (θ) ∼ U [0, 1] fullls all assumptions made in this paper.
Moreover we need some notation. In the following we use bE = maxj bEj
and BE = maxj BEj to indiate the highest of the N entrants' bids and θE =
maxj θEj as the highest of the N entrants' types. Hene, θE is distributed
aording to the highest order statisti of N independent draws from the




We solve the game bakwards by rst analyzing the oer to the inumbent
and his aeptane deision. Then we proeed to the bids of the entrant and
nally we desribe the optimal investment behavior of the inumbent.
Proposition 1 (Oer to inumbent and aeptane in CM):
Let v(bI) := bI −
1−F (bI)
f(bI)




Note that these values will in equilibrium learly dier for the two mehanisms. In




for the Competitive and the
Protetive Mehanism respetively. We omit the index if the ontext is unambiguous or
the expression is equally valid for both mehanisms.
6
We use the virtual valuation funtion v(·) as dened by Bulow and Roberts (1989).
The alloation in an optimal aution as well as the optimal prie setting in monopoly an
be desribed with the help of this virtual valuation.
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Given some investment i and a maximum bid from the entrants bE, in
any equilibrium in the CM, the prourer's oer to the inumbent and I's




= 0 if bE ≤ i−
1
f(0)
= v−1(bE − i) if i−
1
f(0)
≤ bE ≤ i+ 1




= 1 if θI > bI
∈ {0, 1} if θI = bI
= 0 if θI < bI
The proof is given in appendix 3.8.
Remember that the oer is the part of the total benets of the proure-
ment ontrat, that will stay with the prourer, suh that a higher oer in-
reases the prourer's payo, if the inumbent aepts the oer. On the other
hand a higher oer dereases the probability, that the inumbent aepts the
oer, and aordingly the hane for the prourer to prot from the invest-




the prourer wants to realize the benets from the investment and makes an
oer to the inumbent, whih he aepts for sure (bI = 0). If the highest bid
from the entrants is higher than the sum of the investment and the highest
possible valuation of the inumbent(i.e., i+1 ≤ bE), then the prourer wants
to selet the entrant for sure (bI ≥ 1).
Next we an solve for the equilibria of the aution amongst the entrants.
In general the aution amongst the entrants is a symmetri standard aution
with a monotonially downward shifted winning probability. The winning
entrant only wins the ontrat, if the oer indued by his winning bid is
delined by the inumbent. This risk of not winning is the same for all
entrants, observable, and needs to be taken into aount when bidding in the
aution. The entrants antiipate that higher bids inrease the probability
that the prourer will issue an oer to the inumbent, whih he will deline
more often, inreasing the entrants winning probability. This leads us to a
desription of the entrants' bidding behavior.
Proposition 2 (Bids of the entrants in CM): The equilibrium bid funtion b∗(θ)
in CM possesses the following properties:
a) For θ ≤ max{0, i− 1/f(0)}, b∗(θ) ≤ θ and an be hosen arbitrarily.
b) For θ > max{0, i− 1/f(0)},
b∗(θ) is stritly inreasing, ontinuous, and dierentiable almost every-
where with limθ↓max{0,i−1/f(0)} b
∗(θ) = θ.
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A proof is given in appendix 3.8.
In the subsequent analysis we are only interested in integrals of b˙∗(θ).
Thus we an ompute them using (3.1) and negleting the fat that b∗(θ) is
only dierentiable almost everywhere.
The optimal bids for low types θ ≤ max{0, i − 1/f(0)} an be hosen
arbitrarily weakly below the type, as these bids have no hane of winning.
If these types would bid higher, they had a hane of winning, but would
inur negative payos, thus entering any bid, that has no hane of winning
is optimal. Thus we have the optimal bids of the entrants stritly inreasing
in the type and the bid of the lowest type θ > max{0, i−1/f(0)} approahing
his type.
We were not able to prove one additional property of the entrants' optimal
bid funtion b∗, whih we will need in the omparison results setion. The
bids of the entrants should reat to the investment level in a way that a
higher investment also leads to more aggressive bids, but that this reation
does not exeed the inrease in the investment. This leads us to a onjeture





A higher investment raises the value for the prourer of ontrating again
with the inumbent. He will therefore lower his oer and inrease the in-
umbent's winning probability. The entrants see this monotone derease of
their expeted payos and will answer with an inrease in bids db∗/di > 0,
to partially oset the derease in winning probability with a derease in the
payment in the ase of winning the ontrat. This inrease in the expeted
bids will lead to a higher oer. We know that the optimal oer depends
positively on the dierene b∗− i, suh that an inrease in b∗ with db∗/di > 1
would even lead to a higher oer and thus to a derease in the inumbent's
winning probability. We onjeture that, if this was optimal for the entrants,
then it would have been optimal from the beginning and would lead to a
ontradition. Thus the adverse reation of the entrants' optimal bids to an
inrease in the investment must be positive and less than proportional. Nu-
merial omputations suggest, that the onjeture holds at least for N = 2
entrants and uniform distribution of types.
Using proposition 1 on the oer to the inumbent and proposition 2 on
the bids of the entrants, we an investigate the alloation of the ontrat for
a ertain realizations of types and a given investment level i. This will allow
us to ompare the alloation in the two mehanisms to eah other and to the
eient alloation in setion 3.4.
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The inumbent aepts the equilibrium take-it-or-leave-it oer if
θI ≥ v
−1(b∗(θE)− i) ⇐⇒ θE ≤ b
∗−1(v(θI) + i)(3.2)
We use the notation
s(θI |i) := b
∗−1(v(θI) + i)
for the funtion separating the regions in the (θI , θE)diagram in gure 3.1
with the inumbent's valuation on the horizontal axis and the best entrant's
















Fig. 3.1: Contrat alloation over type ombination in CM
For type ombinations on the right of s, the inumbent obtains the pro-
urement ontrat whereas to the left of the line the highest type entrant
obtains the prourement ontrat, given some level of investment i. One an
interpret this resulting ombined mehanism of the oer and the aution as
one non-standard-aution
7
whih implements the alloation rule represented
by s depited in the graph.
Finally we an proeed to the optimal investment by the inumbent. In
order to disuss the optimal investment, we alulate the expeted revenue
of the investment for the inumbent:
7
In this aution the entrants have a rst-prie payment rule, whereas the inumbent
has a seond prie payment rule with a orretion relative to the bid. The highest bidder
wins the aution.
64 Chapter 3. Asymmetri Prourement Mehanisms
Proposition 3 (Investment in CM):
Let the funtion I be an indiator funtion, that is dened as turning 1, if
its ondition is fullled and turning 0 otherwise.8
Then the revenue from investment i in CM
R(i) := E[Id∗=1(θI −B
∗
I + δVI) + Id∗=0δVE]
is inreasing for i ∈ [0, 1 + 1
f(0)
), and onstant for i > 1 + 1
f(0)
.
A proof is given in appendix 3.8.
The revenue from investment inreases with i if the investment is below
a ertain threshold level. Above this level, the investment is so valuable to
the prourer that he will make an oer to the inumbent, whih I will never
rejet. A higher investment only benets the prourer even more, but is of
no use to the inumbent.
3.3.2 Protetive Mehanism
Similar to CM, we derive the equilibrium properties in the Protetive Meh-
anism and start bakwards with the bids of the entrants in the aution, if
the inumbent has delined the oer:
Proposition 4 (Bids of the entrants in PM):







for θ > 0
≤ 0 for θ = 0








A proof is given in appendix 3.8.
If in the Protetive Mehanism the aution amongst the entrants takes
plae, the inumbent must have delined the oer. Thus the aution is a
symmetri standard rst-prie aution amongst the entrants with the known
8
Thus we have for example
Id∗=1 =
{
1 in the ases for whih d∗ = 1
0 in the ases for whih d∗ 6= 1
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properties. The lowest possible type will never win and bid his type. Higher
types will bid monotonially higher, but they will shade their bids to be lower
than their types.
Next we an solve for the aeptane behavior of the inumbent and the
optimal oer from the prourer to the inumbent. This step is struturally
similar to proposition 1 for the Competitive Mehanism. However, now the
prourer doesn't have an atual alternative option from the entrants, but
an expetation about his alternative option in the subsequent aution, if the
inumbent delines his oer. Thus the expeted best bid E[b∗E] replaes the
atual best bid bE in the prourer's optimization problem.
Proposition 5 (Oer to inumbent and aeptane in PM):
Given some investment i, P's oer to I and I's response to this oer must be
of the following form:
b∗I
{
= 0 if E[b∗E] ≤ i−
1
f(0)







= 1 if θI > bI
∈ {0, 1} if θI = bI
= 0 if θI < bI
A proof is given in appendix 3.8.
Compared to the onsiderations in the Competitive Mehanism, we an
omit the ase for the expeted best bid of the entrants exeeding the sum of
the investment and the potential best type of the entrant, as this will never
be reahed.
Again, with the inumbent's aeptane deision we an depit whih
supplier wins for whih ombination of types in gure 3.2 on the same axes










Fig. 3.2: Contrat alloation over type ombination in PM
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Here the inumbent's aeptane deision onditions on the prourer's
oer as in the Competitive Mehanism. Yet the oer an only ondition on
the expeted best type of the entrants, rather than the atual best type.
Thus the alloation must be independent from the atual type of the best
entrant and the separation funtion in the (θI , θE)diagram is a vertial line.




then the prourer makes an oer to the inumbent that he will never rejet.
Like in CM, the last property overs the inumbent's revenue from in-
vestment:
Proposition 6 (Investment in PM):
The revenue from investment in PM
R(i) := E[Id∗=1(θI −B
∗
I + δVI) + Id∗=0δVE]
is inreasing for i ∈ [0,E[b∗E] +
1
f(0)




Furthermore, R(i) is onave for i ∈ [0,E[b∗E] +
1
f(0)
) if v′′(x)/v′(x) ≥ −h(x).
A proof is given in appendix 3.8.
Again the revenue from investment is inreasing in i until the investment
indues an oer from the prourer to the inumbent, suh that the inumbent
aepts for sure. Above this threshold further inreases in the investment are
not protable to the inumbent supplier anymore.
3.4 Comparison results
In order to answer the question for the prourer's hoie of one or the other
mehanism andmore importantlythe determinants of this hoie, we de-
rive results on the omparison of the two mehanisms with respet to bids
and investment. We will merge these results into a partial preferene result
from the view of the prourer. Furthermore we show the impliations for
the expeted length of business with the same supplier and the frequeny of
market interations.
3.4.1 Utility of the prourer
As we enter our analysis around the deision of the prourer we rst examine
his payo struture and the ausal eets that drive his deision. These are
equally valid for both CM and PM, so we an omit to index the funtions
and we abbreviate the entrants' equilibrium bid funtion to b∗ for the ease
of reading.
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The prourer's expeted prot in equilibrium an be written as





P's expeted present period revenue





−C(i∗) + E[Id∗=1(θI + i
∗) + Id∗=0θE]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expeted per period pie size














The rst element is the prourer's expeted present period revenue net
of payments made for the inumbeny advantage. He gets the oer b∗I and
the investment i∗, if the inumbent wins, and the bid b∗, if an entrant wins.
The seond and the third term represent the part of prourer's expeted rent
that is related to business in future periods, alloated on a disounted per
period basis. Herein the seond term is the total expeted pie (= sum of
all distributable rents) in eah period, whih is the inumbent's valuation θI
and the investment i∗, if I wins, and one entrant's valuation θE, if an entrant
wins. To get the net pie size, the investment ost C(i∗) needs to be deduted.
Due to his bargaining power, the prourer an extrat all rents in the future
exept the ontinuation value of an entrant for eah of the N + 1 players in
the game, inumbent or entrant, as eah player an repliate this payo by
intentionally losing the ontrat. So overall the prourers expeted utility in
the long run is the larger the larger the total pie and the lower the minimum
value he must leave with an entrant.
By inserting the ondition for E[U∗E], we get the prourer's expeted equi-
librium payo in an innitely repeated game. For suiently high values of
δ only the value of the future periods in the last braketed expression in (3.3)
is important, i.e.






In ontrast, we get the prourers expeted payo in a one period game by
the rst expression in (3.3). Hene the prourer sees two dierent maximiza-
tion problems in a short-term or long-term perspetive. In the short-term
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he ares about the extration of bids from all suppliers. In the long term
perspetive he ares about the tradeo between eieny and the share of
the pie he is fored to leave over for the other players.
Expression (3.4) allows us to see diretly the inuene of poliy hanges
in the ontrat alloation, the bids, and the investment onto the utility of
the prourer, whih will be useful in the following analysis. We will rst
analyze the behavior of the bids and the investment and derive onditions
for their behavior. These will help us in assessing the mehanism hoie of
the prourer by his expeted utility.
3.4.2 Bids
In the following setions we ompare the equilibria indued by the two on-




for the Competitive and
the Protetive Mehanism respetively to point out dierenes.
At a given investment level i∗, in CM the types below a ertain threshold
an't issue a bid, suh that they make positive prots as shown in proposi-
tion 2. Anypotentially protablebid below the type leads to a winning
probability of zero, any bid above the type ould lead to a positive winning
probability, but an never be protable. For all types above the threshold,
we nd that the diret ompetitive pressure is indeed higher in the Competi-
tive Mehanism than in the Protetive Mehanism: the bids of eah type are
higher in CM than in PM.
Proposition 7 (Bids):
For any investment levels iP and iC and any type θ ∈ (max(0, i− 1/f(0)], 1+
1/f(0)], bids in CM are more aggressive than in PM:
b∗C(θ|iC) ≥ b∗P(θ|iP).
A proof is given in appendix 3.10.
The intuition for this result is lear, if we ompare the general struture
of the aution part of the two mehanisms. In PM we have a symmetri rst
prie aution amongst N bidders. Whereas in CM we have the same aution
but there is a ertain probability that the inumbent will win the ontrat at
a xed prie oer, suh that the entrants eetively play against eah other
and additionally against another player with a distorted payment rule, whih
auses more aggressive bids.
Note that Proposition 7 is valid for arbitrarypotentially dierent
investment levels in CM and PM. This implies that it is also true for the
respetive equilibrium investment level i∗P and i∗C. If in the Protetive Meh-
anism the entrants get to bid in the aution, they know that the inumbent
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must have delined the oer before. Thus the investment payo an never be
payed out to the prourer and will not inuene his deision. Thus it must
not inuene the bids of the entrants and their bidding behavior is ompa-
rable to a setting where the investment is always zero. In the Competitive
Mehanism, however, a positive investment will lead to more aggressive bids
of the entrants, as they are playing against a better alternative option. fur-
thermore we have eetively one further player in the aution, whih also
inreases the aggressiveness of their bidding behavior, suh that we obtain
our result for arbitrary investment levels.
As desribed in setion 3.4.1, we alloate all payments to the period
that auses the respetive payment. Remember, that the observed bid in
one period BEj is onstituted by the payment part for the urrent period
bEj, whih is analyzed above, and a payment that values the inumbeny
advantage for the future periods. The latter part ould ontribute to the
utility of the prourer only via future rent extration from the other players,
whih we will inlude in the nal analysis. Alloating the payments orretly,
we know from the objetive funtion in (3.4), that the prourer prots from
higher bids bEj of the entrants. When omparing the full bids BEj, the
relation B∗C > B∗P need not to hold, due to the rent extration part, whih
ould for PM exeed the lag onerning bids. If the prourer disounts the
future a lot (δ very small) and we have eetively a one period game, then
the future part tends to zero and BEj onverges against bEj.
3.4.3 Investment
In order to ompare the optimal investment in the equilibria of CM and PM,
we need to x a spae of ost funtions. We make statements for the spae
of ost funtions of seond degree polynomials with zero xed osts:
Assumption 2: C(i) := c1i+ c2i
2
with (c1, c2) ∈ R
2
+\{(0, 0)}.
This learly restrits the sope of our analysis, but buys us the struture
to derive meaningful results for some more questions. Restriting the spae of
ost funtions in this way is purely tehnial and should not be too restritive
as it inludes a lass of ost funtions with onstant as well as dereasing
returns to investment.
As seen in the previous setion, the optimal investment in eah of the
mehanisms is bounded from above and weakly dereases in investment ost.
We ompare the two mehanisms by their upper bounds and the ability to
indue investment below these maximum levels.
Proposition 8 (Investment):
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i∗C = 1 +
1
f(0)
> i∗Pmax := max
c1,c2
i∗P = E[bPE] +
1
f(0)
b) For all investment ost parameters c1 and c2 suh that i
∗C < i∗Pmax, we
have i∗C < i∗P.
Conversely, for all investment ost parameters c1 and c2 suh that i
∗C >
i∗P, we have i∗P = i∗Pmax.
Part b) is valid, if two tehnial onditions on the distribution funtion




and for i ≥ 0
1− F (v−1(E[b∗P]− i))
v′(v−1(E[b∗P]− i))
≥ E[
1− F (v−1(b∗P − i))
v′(v−1(b∗P − i))
](3.6)
A proof is given in appendix 3.10.
For a xed set of investment ost parameters c1 and c2, at whih the
optimal investment level in CM (i∗C) is below the maximum investment in PM
(i∗Pmax), we have that the optimal investment in CM is always also below the
optimal investment in PM. Conversely, for a xed set of ost parameters, the
investment in CM an only exeed the investment in PM, if the investment
in PM is at its upper bound.
The investment behavior might appear ounterintuitive at rst. With
the protetive mehanism, the prourer intends to protet the inumbent
from diret market pressure and to indue indiret market pressure with the
threat to hose an entrant, if the inumbent delines the oer. At higher
investment ost, the inumbent an in fat make himself more attrative to
the prourer by inreasing the investment. However, the prourer must take
into aount, that at very low investment ost, the diret market pressure in
the ompetitive mehanism works better, as the inumbent in the protetive
mehanism an not be driven to higher investments, if he is already fully
proteted from the ompetition.
The optimal investment behavior in a (c2, i
∗)-plane for F (·) being uni-
formly distributed and c1 = 0 an be displayed in a shemati diagram in
gure 3.3.







Fig. 3.3: Optimal investment omparison between CM and PM
At very low investment ost c2, where investment in PM has already
reahed its maximum level, the optimal investment in CM exeeds the level
in PM. For higher investment ost, the Protetive Mehanism is able to
indue higher investments.
We an examine the mehanis behind the investment in more detail.
Given the limited ommitment and the inomplete transferability of utility
in the model, investment an only be driven by the transfer of utility from the
prourer to the inumbent via the oer. The inumbent will investtransfer
utility to the prourer as long as the prourer is willing to ompensate
him by lowering the oer, i.e., transfer winning probability from the entrant
to the inumbent. This only works as long as the inumbent doesn't win
for sure, i.e., at an oer b∗I > 0. Hene, investment never exeeds an upper
bound, even if the investment ost beome very low.
The maximum investment level is reahed earlier in the Protetive Meh-
anism, as in PM I wins for sure, if he is suiently better than the expeted
alternative option of the prourerthe expeted highest bid of the entrants.
Whereas in CM, where the prourer knows the bid of the best entrant be-
fore he makes the oer, I invests with less information than the prourer has
when making the oer. Thus to win for sure in CM he has to be suiently
better than the best alternative option the prourer might have, rather than
the expeted average alternative option.
Before the investment in the Protetive Mehanism reahes its upper
bound, it always displays higher levels than in the Competitive Mehanism.
The CM provides the inumbent with a lower marginal return of invest-
ment: An inrease in the investment in the CM an be observed by the
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entrants. To preserve their probability of winning against the inumbent,
they respond with more aggressive bids. This in turn indues a higher oer
from the prourer due to a better alternative option. This higher oer lowers
the inumbents marginal revenue from investment. The prourer an not
ommit, not to use the better information from the alternative option. This
adverse response to the inrease in the investment an not be present in PM
by the timing of events.
Finally, the assumptions in the statement in Proposition 8b need some
qualiation. The statement holds if (1 − F (x))/v′(x) is dereasing, whih
is assumption (3.5) and if it is "not too onvex". The admissible degree
of onvexity depends on quantitative properties of b∗C, whih we annot
ompute expliitly. To obtain a purely tehnial ondition we have to rely on
a broad estimate instead and propose assumption (3.6). It holds for example,
if for a distribution funtion we have that (1− F (x))/v′(x) is onave. This
ondition holds for distribution funtions that do not have too muh weight
on the extremes. Espeially it holds for F (·) being uniformly distributed.
3.4.4 Mehanism hoie
In the previous setions we have shown, that onerning the bids, the pro-
urer prefers the Competitive Mehanism, and onerning the investment
he prefers the Protetive Mehanism for high and medium investment ost
and the Competitive Mehanism for low investment ost. In this setion we
an ombine these results and add impliitly the willingness of the suppliers
to pay for the inumbeny status advantage in future periods. This eet
an turn around the results and we show that there are in fat points in
the investment ost spae for whih the Competitive Mehanism produes
higher bids as well as a higher investment, but the prourer still prefers the
Protetive Mehanism.
In general the ombination of the single eets turns out to produe om-
plex ombined eets, suh that a omplete haraterization of the prourer's
hoie of mehanisms for every point in the ost spae needs to remain open
in this analyti approah. However, we an identify points in the ost spae,
where we an derive the superiority of one or the other mehanism, that
show that not one of the two mehanisms dominates the other for all ost
parameters. Thus we an onlude, that the prourer's hoie of a proure-
ment mehanism should depend on the spei harateristis of the part
proured, rather than preferring a single mehanism throughout the whole
portfolio of parts.
In the following proposition we identify points in whih the prourer
prefers one or the other mehanism. Subsequently we give some intuition
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on the results.
Proposition 9 (Mehanism Choie): If δ is suiently lose to one, then there
exist ost parameters where the prourer prefers PM to CM, and there exist
ost parameters where the reverse holds.
In partiular, we an identify the following points:
(I) At heap investment, CM indues a so muh higher investment suh
that P prefers CM over PM.
(II) If there are suiently many entrants, at medium expensive invest-
ments there exist points with equal investment, where we have i∗P =
i∗C = i∗Pmax in whih P prefers PM over CM.
A proof is given in appendix 3.10.
As the ombination of all single eets an lead to omplex total eets,
we an make lear statements best for points in the ost parameter spae
where either one eet turns less important. Espeially helpful is the identi-
ation of points in the ost spae, where investment ost are unimportant
either beause they are very low (as for point (I)) or beause they are equal in
PM and in CM (as for point (II)). Realling the prourer's objetive funtion
in equation (3.4), we see that for these ases P's preferene for either one of
the mehanisms hinges only on two things: eieny of the ontrat alloa-
tion, whih maximizes E[Id∗=1(θI+i
∗)+Id∗=0θE], and the rent he has to leave
to the players. Thus we an restrit the preferene analysis for these points to
an assessment on the eieny of the alloation and the entrants' expeted
rents. The rst is maximized if the ontrat is awarded to the player with
the highest valuation, orreted for the investment. In a (θI , θE)diagram
the eient alloation is determined by a 45-degree-line shifted upwards by
the investment level i∗ as displayed in gure 3.4. Above this line it is e-
ient if the highest valuation entrant obtains the ontrat, below this line it
is eient if the inumbent wins the ontrat again.





efficiency line i∗ + θI
Fig. 3.4: Eient ontrat alloation
If the investment from the inumbent exeeds the best possible type of
the entrants, the line is shifted all the way up into the orner and the only
eient alloation is, if the inumbent wins always.
The seond expression for the rent the prourer has to leave with the other
players, −(N + 1)/N ·E[Id∗=0(θE−b
∗(θE))], inreases with the entrants' bids
and dereases with the probability for an entrant to win the ontrat. Thus
the prourer will be able to extrat higher rents from the players, if he hooses
the mehanism, that indues the highest bids of the entrants and that lets
them win less often, as both render the status of an entrant less attrative
and allow higher rent extration from the inumbent via indiret market
pressure.
With the help of the onsiderations in the previous paragraphs, we an
provide some intuition for proposition 9. At very low investment ostfor
point (I)both mehanisms CM and PM indue suh a high investment level
that the prourer lets the inumbent win with a probability arbitrarily lose
to one. By Proposition 8 the investment level in CM is higher than in PM. As
in both mehanisms the entrants have a payo of arbitrarily lose to zero and
investment osts are negligible, only the eieny part of expression (3.4) is
relevant. The higher investment renders CM better.
The existene of point (II) hinges on two onditions. First, the alloation
rule of the ontrat is loser to the eient alloation in PM than in CM.
And seond, the entrants obtain a smaller rent in PM than in CM.
To rank the alloation in the two mehanisms, we need to nd the eient
alloation rst. For a high number of entrants the expeted best bid of the
entrants approahes 1 from below. For suiently low investment ost we
know that the optimal investment reahes 1 in both mehanisms. Thus, the
eient alloation is reahed, if the inumbent wins the ontrat for sure.
3.4. Comparison results 75
At a point of equal investment we know from proposition 8 that only in
the protetive mehanism the inumbent wins for sure, whereas in the CM
the entrants have a non zero probability of winning the ontrat. Thus the
protetive mehanism is at this point learly more eient.
9
The same line of reasoning also shows that the payo of an entrant in
the CM must be higher, as he has a probability to win bigger than zero in
the CM, rather than no hane of winning in the PM. So the prourer favors
the Protetive Mehanism onerning both eets disussed, he is neutral
onerning the investment and overall he favors the Protetive Mehanism.
Note espeially, that sine point (II) is at ost parameters whih indue
equal investment, there are also a region of ost parameters around (II) with
slightly higher investment in CM. By proposition 7 bids are also unambigu-
ously higher in CM. Nevertheless the prourer prefers PM in the repeated
game due to the stritly better alloation as disussed above. In a one pe-
riod game, that does not onsider payments for the inumbeny status in the
future, the prourer would prefer CM to PM. The rent extration for future
periods turns this result and renders PM better. This behavior is provoked
by the inumbent's bigger fear to lose the ontrat and beome an entrant
next period in PM than in CM. Therefore P is able to extrat a higher rent
from the inumbent in PM. This eet exeeds quantitatively the higher bids
and investment in CM.
With the ontinuity of the funtions underlying these onsiderations we
onjeture, that the behavior that prevails at the points an be extended to
regions around these points, that ultimately span the ost spae. However
already from the existene of the two points we an onlude, that the pro-
urement mehanism should be dierent aording to the properties of the
parts proured and no one mehanism dominates the other for the whole ost
spae.
3.4.5 Supplemental remarks
Before we onlude we briey disuss some interesting supplemental remarks
without providing proofabout the two mehanisms, that we an derive from
the insights above, and whih we an relate to the ase study evidene in the
next setion.
9
Note that Point (II) exists for arbitrary distributions of types as long as we have a
suiently high number of entrants N . There are always onstellations of ost parameters
for whih the inumbent in PM already wins for sure, whereas in CM sometimes an entrant
wins and this result does not depend on the distribution assumptions of Proposition 8.
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Repetition
As disussed in the introdution, innite repetition of a stage game is rarely
used in this literature so far. In this model we show that some results are
invariant to the repetition. Some others in fat depend on the repetition or
the way in whih repetition is modelled.
In this model we an see, that the optimal investment level and the ex-
peted pie size (= sum of all players' rents) in CM and in PM is independent
of the repetition of the game. However, the division of the pie amongst the
players, and thus the prourer's preferenes over the mehanisms, depends
on the repetition. If we hange the number of repetitions it is ambiguous,
whether a spei player's rent inreases or dereases.
Thus, if one is interested in situations of repeated prourement in whih
players are not aware of a nal prourement period, modelling the game
as being innitely repeated seems more aurate than onsidering a one
repeated game.
Shortlist
The superiority of the protetive mehanism relies on the prourer's ability
to ommit not to use the better information about his alternative option.
Similarly we ould think of situations in whih the prourer prots from
ommitment to restrit the number of entrants onsidered in the aution, as
this also intentionally deteriorates his alternative option.
In the model we see, that there exist ombinations of ost parameters at
whih P prefers to restrit the number of entrants in PM. Simple examples for
these eets an be obtained by onsidering P's utility from PM as funtion
of the number of bidders N for the ase with uniformly distributed types.
Typially prouring ompanies reruit possible suppliers only from a pre-
dened list of suppliers that fulll a ertain quality standard. Given this
xed ost of maintaining a potential supplier on the list, this result an eas-
ily be obtained. In our model this behavior holds without the introdution
of additional osts, purely out of reasons inherent to the prourement hoie.
3.5 Empirial evidene
This paper was developed in the ontext of broader researh on supply net-
works in the automotive industry. One enterpiee is a series of deep ase
interviews with suppliers and ar manufaturers on their strategi supply
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and purhasing behavior.
10
The authors interviewed 15 suppliers and three
ar manufaturers on questions onerning the parts supplied, the organiza-
tion of purhasing, the supply strategies, the information about other players
in the market, the ontratual arrangements, and the ompetitive situation.
We draw on the empirial evidene of this ase study to omment on the
assumptions and results of the theoretial model.
In the automotive industry, the struture of one inumbent and multiple
entrant suppliers is very ommon. The inumbeny advantage due to idiosyn-
rati proess knowledge is sizeable. A swith from one supplier to another
is legally possible without ompliations, as the manufaturer mostly owns
the tools to produe the parts. Adversely, in pratie swithing is very ex-
pensive, as the tools are omplemented with very spei proess knowledge,
that an not easily be repliated by a new supplier. Thus the swithing ost
onstitutes the bigger part of the inumbeny advantage. Furthermore the
resulting level of swithing ost is endogenous and an be set by the inum-
bent, as displayed in this model. Furthermore the ase study suggests, that
modelling innite repetition of a stage game is adequate. The manufaturers
as well as the suppliers are long-lived and the possible interations should
not indue end game behavior. In the same sense also the ommitment to
a ertain purhasing strategy is long-term. The purhasing strategy only
beomes eetive (onerning its impliations for the suppliers' long-term in-
novation strategy) if the OEM an build up reputation for a ertain strategy.
Thus we model long-term strategies onerning the hoie of a purhasing
mehanism speifying the order of bargaining stages. In ontrast, the ase
study shows evidene for a widely opportunisti behavior of all players in the
short-run. Consequently we set up the model without ex-ante ommitment
on deisions within the stages, i.e. prie setting and aeptane deisions on
ontrat oers. Commonly, supply ontrats beome binding only when the
rst part has been delivered, long after sizable investments in development,
apaity, and idiosynrati tools have been made.
These prerequisites lead to a behavior that is similar to the one predited
in our model. Typially two distint ontratual models between the ar
manufaturer and the supplier an be observed. Either there are framework
ontrats over a ar model lifetime with repeated prie renegotiations or there
are short-term ontratsmuh shorter than a ar model lifetimewith the
ommon pattern of multiple repeated transations with the inumbent sup-
plier. In both models, the prourer needs to deide on the level of information
10
A ase study survey by Florian Mueller, Konrad O. Stahl and Frank Wahtler, Uni-
versity of Mannheim, is forthoming. The interview series reeived support from VDA,
the Assoiation of the German automotive industry.
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he wants to have about his alternative option from the entrants before enter-
ing the renegotiations with the inumbent. Either he exerises pressure via
autions during the urrent ontrat lifetime, that give him the information
about market pries, as well as an alternative option if the renegotiations
don't sueed. Alternatively the prourer onduts internal re-engineering
and prodution ost estimates, that supply him with the needed information
before negotiating with his inumbent supplier. The prourer onduts a
publi aution only if the renegotiations fail. We identify these two basi
strategies with the ompetitive mehanism, and the protetive mehanism
respetively, in the theoretial model. In fat, the resulting supply relation-
ships (espeially in the protetive mehanism) to one inumbent are very
long-lived and span at least one whole ar model lifetime. One ar manufa-
turer pointed out, that for the purhasing of some parts, he deided to swith
to a model without frequent publi autions in order to redue the number
of supplier swithes, without fearing to suer from muh higher purhasing
pries, while applying internal information gathering about the purhased
parts. This ar produer was in fat even not a (pure) premium supplier and
was thus operating in a strongly prie driven market.
3.6 Extensions
In order to further approah a realisti behavior of the model, one an think
of ample extensions.
One key feature of a model that emphasizes extensive treatment of in-
nite repetition would be to inorporate stronger interdependenies between
the periods. One natural way to model this will be learning on the types of
the other players or on the tehnology used. The rst advoates the intro-
dution of orrelated types of the inumbent over time. It is less oerive to
assume that the entrants' types should be orrelated as well. In this setting
the prourer will make his deision depend on the established type of the
inumbent and will thus reeive additional utility from a protetive meha-
nism with potentially longer periods of business relations. Another way to
extend the model in this diretion is learning about the investment, whih
is loser related to the ore of this model. One ould for example think of
an additional type variable of the suppliers, that governs the ability of the
supplier to deliver the utility from the investment. This ability is orrelated
between the periods and should in a similar way lead to more favoritism for
a strong inumbent and maintain the relationships between the two meha-
nisms. Learning by doing onerning the investment an also be analyzed in
this spirit. This would lead to dereasing investment osts in onseutive pe-
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riods in one business relation. The prourer would at the same time be better
able to extrat value from the inumbent due to the redued investment ost,
and we would see longer supply relations, due to the OEM's inreased value
from repeated transations.
Our model so far demands ommitment ability of the players only on
behalf of the prourer, when deiding for one mehanism. One an also relieve
this requirement, suh that the mehanism deision takes plae within eah
stage game on the verge of the rst aution or oer. Thus the mehanism
hoie will now depend on the inumbent's hosen investment.
Our results an be augmented with the analysis of periods with variable
length. The duration of a ontrat is now a property of the oer and the
aution, whih is set by the prourer upfront.
3.7 Conlusion
We have shown that, there exist situations in whih one prourement meh-
anism dominates the other and vie versa. Moreover we ould see, that in
situations in whih we have learly higher diret market pressure with higher
bids and with higher investment in the Competitive Mehanism, in a repeated
game it pays for the prourer to 'protet' his inumbent, and by doing so,
induing a higher indiret market pressure. So the answer to the quest for
the best mehanism needs to be: both, depending on the ability to realize
benets from ooperation and to extrat the proeeds afterwards from the
suppliers. This should be reeted in the prourement portfolio of rms,
whih exhibits many dierenes in the ability to produe benets of oopera-
tion, e.g., between standardized and new produts, simple and sophistiated
produts, supply from ountries with high or low ooperation potential. Fur-
thermore, we suggest that in long-term ontrat models the pressure on the
suppliers does not need to be lower, just beause one observes obvious market
interationslike prourement autionsless frequently.
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3.8 Appendix: Proofs equilibria
Proof of Proposition 1:
First we solve the inumbent's maximization problem:
Step C1: d∗ ∈ maxd∈{0,1} E[UI |θI ] given i, BE1, . . . , BEn, BI
d∗ = 1 =⇒ −C(i) + θI −BI + δVI ≥ −C(i) + δVE
=⇒ θI ≥ BI − δ(VI − VE) = bI
d∗ = 0 =⇒ θI ≤ BI − δ(VI − VE) = bI
In equilibrium the probability of aeptane is uniquely given by
Prob(d∗ = 1) = 1− F (b∗I).
Given the aeptane deision of the inumbent, the prourer sets his
oer BI aording to the following maximization problem:
Step C2: B∗I ∈ maxBI∈R E[UP ] given i, BE1, . . . , BEn
Now we determine the optimal oer to the inumbent b∗I . If P wants I to
aept the oer for sure, P will oer I the ontrat for the highest prie I will
always aept, i.e. bI = 0. Conversely, oering bI ≥ 1 will always lead to
a sure rejetion, as this exeeds the maximum valuation. Therefore, we an
restrit attention to bI ∈ [0, 1].
Maximizing P's expeted payo by hoosing bI ∈ [0, 1] gives us
max
bI∈[0,1]
Prob(d∗ = 1)(BI + i+ δVP ) + (1− Prob(d
∗ = 1))(BE + δVP )
= F (bI)(bE − bI − i) + bI + i+ δ(VP − VI + VE)
The rst derivative of the objetive funtion is given by f(bI)(bE − i− v(bI))
of bI . Sine v(bI) is stritly inreasing by Assumption 1
11
and f(bI) is stritly
positive, we get a orner solution b∗ = 0 if bE− i−v(0) = bE− i+1/f(0) ≤ 0
and a orner solution b∗ = 1 if bE − i − v(1) = bE − i − 1 ≥ 0. In all other
ases we get the interior solution b∗I = v
−1(bE − i). q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 2:
11 v(x) := x− 1/h(x), v′(x) = 1 + h′(x)/h(x)2 > 0 by Assumption 1.
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The maximization problem for the entrants is:
Step C3: B∗Ej ∈ maxBEj∈R E[UE|θEj] given i
To obtain his optimal bidding funtion, entrant Ej solves for any of his
types the following problem, given the optimal bidding funtion b∗El(θ) =
b∗(θ) of all other entrants:
max
BEj∈R
Prob(B∗El(θEl) ≤ BEj ∀l 6= j)Prob(d
∗ = 0)(θEj −BEj + δVI)






N−1F (b∗I(bEj))(θEj − bEj) + δVE(3.7)
In order to have a positive probability of winning, Ej must submit a bid suh
that P's oer to I is rejeted with positive probability, i.e. bEj > i− 1/f(0).
Types θEj ≤ i− 1/f(0) are not willing to do so. For them any bid bEj ≤ θEj
is optimal:
b∗(θ) ≤ θ for θ ≤ i− 1/f(0)
In the remainder of this proof we derive properties of b∗(θ) for θ > i−1/f(0).
Property 1: b∗(θ) is stritly inreasing. Proof by ontradition. A
diret onsequene of this property is that b∗(θ) is dierentiable almost
everywhere.
Property 2: b∗(θ) is ontinuous. Proof by ontradition.
Property 3: limθ↓max{0,i−1/f(0)} b
∗(θ) = θ. Proof by ontradition.
Property 1 and 3 imply that b∗(θ) > i−1/f(0) for all relevant types. Sine
Ej never bids more than his typeand thus never more than his maximum
type 1. This implies b∗(θ) ≤ i + 1. Hene, we are always in the ase of
proposition 1 with b∗I = v
−1(b− i).
Using this, the objetive funtion in problem (3.7) an be written as
UEj(bEj) = F (b
−1(bEj))
N−1F (v−1(bEj − i))(θEj − bEj) + δVE.
If b∗(θEj) is the maximizer of UEj(b), the following must be true:
UEj(b








≤ 0 for ǫ > 0
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For all θEj ∈ (max{0, i−1/f(0)}, 1) where b˙
∗(θEj) exists, both limits oinide
and the expression on the left-hand-side must be zero. Reformulating this,
we obtain (3.1). q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The inumbent's maximization problem is given by:
Step C4: i∗ ∈ maxi∈R+ E[UI ]
We prove the proposition for three ases.
Case 1: For i ∈ [0, 1/f(0)], we have b∗I = v
−1(b∗E(θE)− i) ∈ [0, 1] and an






















(1− F (s−1(θE|i)))dF (θE)
N
To show that revenue is inreasing it remains to show that s−1(θI |i) is de-
reasing in i. This means that higher i shifts the separation funtion s to the
left, suh that the inumbent obtains the prourement ontrat more often.
Sine s−1 is impliitly dened by (3.2) holding with equality, i.e.

























The onjeture implies that this expression is positive.
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Case 2: For i ∈ [1/f(0), 1 + 1
f(0)
] we have b∗I = 0 for θE ≤ s(0|i) and
b∗I = v



































(1− F (s−1(θE|i)))dθIdF (θE)
N














Again, The onjeture implies that this expression is positive.
Case 3: For i > 1 + 1/f(0) the oer to the inumbent is always b∗I = 0
and so revenue does not respond on hanges in the investment i. q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The entrants' maximization problem is given by:
Step P1: B∗Ej ∈ maxBEj∈R E[UE|θEj] given i, BI , d
Sine this is a standard symmetri rst prie aution, refer to any stan-
dard aution textbook, e.g. Krishna (2003). The ontinuation values do not
inuene this result. q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The inumbents aeptane deision and the prourer's oer to the in-
umbent are aptured in the maximization problem:
Step P1: B∗Ej ∈ maxBEj∈R E[UE|θEj] given i, BI , d
Step P2: d∗ ∈ maxd∈{0,1} E[UI |θI ] given i, BI
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(Step P2) Analogous to (Step C1) in the Proof for Proposition 1.
(Step P3) Analogous to (Step C2) in the Proof for Proposition 1 with
the highest bid of the entrants bE being replaed by the expetation of the
highest bid E[b∗E], as the aution has not yet taken plae. Sine we know that
E[b∗E] ≤ 1 from Proposition 4, we anompared to CMomit one ase of
b∗I whih never ours.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 6:
The inumbent's optimization problem for the investment is given by:
Step P4: i∗ ∈ maxi∈R+ E[UI ]
For all i > E[b∗E] + 1/f(0) we have b
∗
I = 0. Hene, I's revenue is equal for
all i above this bound.
If i < E[b∗E] + 1/f(0), we have b
∗
I = v
−1(E[b∗E]− i) ∈ [0, 1] and an apply











(1− F (θI))dθI + δVE
R′(i) =












R(i) is onave if v′′(x)/v′(x) ≥ −h(x). q.e.d.
3.9 Appendix: Auxiliary Results
Lemma 1: Let θE be the highest of the entrants' types, i.e. let θE be dis-
tributed aording to F (θE)
N
. Let d∗, b∗I and b
∗
be as speied in the equi-




I ] = E[Id∗=1v(θI)] and E[Id∗=0b
∗(θE)] = E[Id∗=0v(θE)]
with v(θ) = θ − 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
being the virtual valuation funtion. distributed
aording to F (θ).
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Proof. Sine the take-it-or-leave-it-oer and the aution between the en-
trants an be interpreted as a ompliated aution between the entrants and
the inumbent in whih the entrants have rst-prie paying rules and the
inumbent has 'some kind of seond-prie paying rule', we an ompute ex-
peted payments using the Revenue Equivalene Theorem (see Mas-Colell,
Whinston, and Green (1995) Proposition 23.D.3). To do so we need the al-
loation rule and the expeted prot of players (inumbent and entrant) of
type zero from the aution. The alloation rule is speied by d∗ = 1 and the
lowest type players obtain zero prot from the atual aution. A lowest type
entrant never has a positive probability of winning, a lowest type inumbent
may have a positive probability of winning, but has to pay his entire valua-
tion in this ase. q.e.d.
3.10 Appendix: Proofs omparison results
Proof of Proposition 7:
(i) From Proposition 2 and Proposition 4 it follows that the 'lowest' type








= (N − 1)r(θ)(θ − b∗C)
1
1− (θ − b∗C) r(v
−1(b∗C−iC))
v′(v−1(b∗C−iC))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1 for all iC sine r, v′ > 0
almost everywhere. This implies that if b∗P and b∗C were equal for some
θ, b∗C inreases faster.
Therefore, (i) and (ii) imply that the b∗C lies always weakly above the b∗P
funtion. q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 8:
88 Chapter 3. Asymmetri Prourement Mehanisms
a) From Proposition 3 and Proposition 6 we know that marginal revenue
of investment is positive in CM for i < 1 + 1
f(0)




. Marginal revenue is zero if i lies above this bounds. If
ost parameters c1 and c2 are suiently low, I has an inentive to
invest until marginal revenue beomes zero.
b) We prove this Proposition in two steps:
i) i∗C < i∗Pmax implies i
∗P ≥ i∗C
ii) i∗C ≥ i∗Pmax implies i
∗P = i∗Pmax




larger in PM than in CM.
RP′(i) =







































[*℄ holds sine (1−F (x))/v′(x) is dereasing by the assumption in (3.5)
and bids are more ompetitive in CM than in PM by Proposition 7.
[**℄ holds sine (1− F (x))/v′(x) is positive and sine b∗C/di ∈ (0, 1).
Suppose now the ontrary, that i∗P < i∗C. Then we have












Optimality of i∗C implies that the last integral is positive, otherwise
I would have an inentive to lower his investment. But then, by
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RC′(i) ≥ RP′(i), I ould inrease his payo in PM by also investing
i∗C. Contradition.
ad ii) Assume to the ontrary that i∗P < i∗Pmax, but i
∗C > i∗Pmax. We
show that in this ase C ′(i∗C) > R∗C′(i∗C) would hold, ontraditing
optimality of i∗C.
i∗P < i∗Pmax together with onavity of R
P
and onvexity of C imply
C ′(i∗Pmax) > R
P
′(i∗Pmax). For i ≥ i
∗P
max we have C
′(i) ≥ C ′(i∗Pmax). Showing
that RP′(i∗Pmax) ≥ R
C































[***℄ follows from b∗C/di ∈ (0, 1).
[****℄ follows from (1 − F (x))/v′(x) being dereasing and −1/f(0) ≤
b∗C(θE)− i sine b
∗C(θE) > i− 1/f(0) for θE > s(0|i) by Proposition 2.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 9:
(I) If ost parameters are suiently lose to zero, investment levels in CM
and PM are arbitrarily lose to i∗Cmax and i
∗P
max, and I wins the ontrat
in eah period with a probability arbitrarily lose to one. Furthermore,
investment ost are negligible in this ase. Plugging this in (3.4) and
omparing obtains the result.
(II) Consider ost parameters suh that i∗ := i∗P = i∗C = i∗Pmax. If i
∗C
behaves ontinuously for varying ost parameters, existene of suh
parameter onstellations is guaranteed by Proposition 8. Plugging this
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investment in expression (3.4) we obtain








for CM: −C(i∗) + E[Id∗P=1(θI + i








If i∗ ≥ 1, whih is partiularly satised if there are suiently many
entrants, suh that 1/f(0)+E[b∗PE] ≥ 1, we unambiguously have [1P ] >
[1C] independently of how Id∗C=1 exatly looks like. Furthermore we
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4.1 Introdution
Inreased ompetition between rms in a market an be dened as an in-
rease in the number of rms present or, alternatively, as a dereased hori-
zontal dierentiation between a onstant number of rms in a xed market.
Standard thinking about these two kinds of ompetition in an oligopolisti
market would suggest that an inrease in ompetition may lead to weakly
lower pries in this market.
In ontrast, oligopoly models with additional features like repeated in-
terations, ollusion, threats, or taste for variety, eventually produe a oun-
tervailing eet. But even these models in general display the onventional
ompetition eet as desribed above. So will, for example, more ompeti-
tion in equilibrium also lead to a dereased propensity of ollusion and thus
lower pries.
We show in this ontribution, that even in a simple setting of horizontally
dierentiated goods inreased ompetition
1
may in fat lead to higher pries
without expliit ommuniation amongst the players.
We use a one stage standard model of horizontal dierentiation as in-
trodued by Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979) to lay out the theoretial
grounds. The existene of this eet has in priniple been mentioned (in par-
tiular in Salop (1979) and Eonomides (1989)) before, but has never been
appreiated as reasonable strategi behaviour of the players. However, we
nd empirial evidene, that this eet exists in reality.
We analyze the omparative statis of the model in depth in setion 4.3.
Subsequently in setion 4.4, we nd evidene for a positive relationship be-
tween pries and the density of rms in a market of petrol stations in German
ities.
Our theoretial model losely follows the basi setup and equilibria of the
priing game as introdued by Salop (1979). Readers familiar with this work
are welome to skip setion 4.3 ompletely, or go to setions 4.3.4 and 4.3.5
for a review of the best response strategies of the rms and the resulting
equilibria before ontinuing with setion 4.4.
4.2 Literature
To a large extent, the post-Hotelling (1929) literature on horizontally dier-
entiated produts onerned itself with nding the existene of an equilib-
rium in a Hotelling model of positioning and priing, ever after d'Aspremont,
1
Here, the two kinds of inreased ompetition oinide in terms of optimizing behaviour
of the rms.
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Gabszewiz, and Thisse (1979) have shown that the original speiation of
Hotelling (1929) did note have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the pri-
ing subgame for rm loations that were too lose to eah other. Also, for
example, Anderson (1986; 1988) and Osborne and Pithik (1987) investi-
gate mostly the existene of equilibria. Those from this group that report
the priing behaviour as a funtion of distane all have a monotone positive
relationship between the two.
On the other hand, Salop (1979) and Eonomides (1989) are two works
that do report the non-monotone prie behaviour that we investigate here,
although these authors seem to have believed the eet to be strange and
diult to see in reality. These papers dier from the rst group in one
ritial point: their models have an outside option for onsumers to hoose,
while the former models fored all onsumers to partiipate in the market.
In our modelwhih is a diret desendant of Salop (1979)if all onsumers
were made to buy at least from one rm, the priing behaviour would also
be monotone.
There exists other work that also derives seemingly ounter-intuitive (at
least from traditional point of view) results about the behaviour of the rms
in horizontally dierentiated marketplaes, but these papers have dierent
settings. For example, Stahl (1982) and Shulz and Stahl (1996) study exter-
nalities from many rms in one marketplae, whih may lead single-produt
rms in one marketplae to harge higher pries than a multi-produt mo-
nopolist. They do not look at ompeting marketplaes, whih makes their
results dierent to our paper.
4.3 The Model
Our goal is to investigate the priing of a duopoly in a dierentiated goods
market, where the degree of dierentiation is given by a transportation ost à
la Hotelling. As referene ases, we use the priing strategies in two monopoly
settings.
4.3.1 Set-up
The market is given by a Salop irle
2
of irumferene 2·s. Eah point on the
irle represents a dierentiated good that is most preferred by a onsumer
oupying that point. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the irle,
with density 1/s, whih results in a onstant onsumer mass of 2. There are
two idential rms, positioned exatly opposite eah other at 0 and s. Like
2
f. Salop (1979)
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Salop (1979), we are interested in the analysis of the short term behaviour
in the priing game and thus we also assume that the rms' positions are
xed exogenously. We normalise marginal osts of prodution to zero. When
a onsumer x onsumes a good oered at y 6= x, he inurs a disutility or
transportation ost, t · |x− y|, aording to the shortest ar-length distane
between x and y. Consumption of either good delivers to the onsumer a
pure utility of a > 0 in monetary terms, whih is then adjusted for the prie
paid and the transportation ost.
Earlier work was onerned with the non-existene of pure strategy equi-
libria in similar Hotelling settings. We hoose our set-up in a simple way,
suh that typial problems pertaining to pure strategies
3
do not our, in
order to allow for lear presentation of our ase. This relates to the amount
of rms and their symmetri position, given whih, it is impossible to obtain
the hinterland of your ompetitor. Take rm i, whih pries suh that the
onsumer at loation of its rival, −i, just prefers −i to i. Lowering its prie
by a small amount, rm i does not gain all of the onsumers on the other side
of −i, beause it has already been serving those onsumers from the other
side of the irle. The hinterland does not exist.
Due to the same reasoning and for simpliity of exposition we an ut the
irle in half and obtain our market as a line from 0 to s with rms positioned
on the opposite sides and onsumers uniformly distributed with density 1/s
and a total mass of one.
4.3.2 Consumption deision
Consumers are utility maximizers and buy one or zero units of a good from
at most one of the ompanies present. This deision is summarised in the
onditions (4.1) and (4.2) below. If they buy zero units from the rms in
question, they buy some homogeneous outside good, whih osts 0 and de-
livers 0 utility to every onsumer, irrespetive of loation.
Denition 1 (Utility form): Let a, s, t ∈ R+. For the person loated at an
address x between 0 and s (at a distane z0 = x or z1 = s− x from rm 0 or
rm 1 respetively), when buying a good from rm i at prie pi, the indiret
utility is given by the additive separable funtion
ux(pi, zi) = a− pi − t · zi .
3
e.g., jumps in demand due to underutting the rival's prie, leading to non-existene
of pure strategy equilibria.
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Thus, given rms' pries pi, p−i ∈ [0, a], the onsumer loated at x buys
produt i if and only if: (a) he prefers good i to good −i,
(4.1) ux(pi, zi) ≥ ux(p−i, z−i)
and (b) he prefers good i to the outside option,
(4.2) ux(pi, zi) ≥ 0
4.3.3 Aggregate demand and rms' prots
As the onsumers do not at strategially, we an map their deisions diretly
into the (piee-wise linear) demand funtion for the rms. The rms an
apture the market from their position up to an indierent onsumer. This
onsumer is either indierent between buying the rm's produt and buying
the other produt (fullling (4.1) with equality)or he is indierent between
buying the produt and not buying (fullling (4.2) with equality). Consumers
further away from the rm than the indierent onsumer either buy the other
produt or do not buy at all. There either exists one indierent onsumer,
if all onsumers are served or there are two indierent onsumers, if some
onsumers in the middle of the market are not served.
Firms set pries pi ∈ [0, a]a ompat, onvex set. Setting any prie
equal to or above a would lead to demand of zero for rm i. Therefore, we
establish the upper bound a on the prie set. Relaxing this assumption does
not hange the results.
The piee-wise demand equation for rm i is then given by the distane
from that rm to the losest indierent onsumer weighted with the density
of onsumers 1/s on that part of the market.
(4.3)




















The piee-wise linear parts of the demand an be assoiated with regions
of demand patterns, whih are desribed below. An example for the demand
for rm i's produt depending on its prie pi is shown in gure 4.1.
[0℄ Demand is zero if a rm pries higher than the prie of its ompetitor
at the rm's loation
(
(pi ≥ p−i + st) ∧ (p−i ≤ a− st)
)
or too high for
all onsumers at (pi = a)
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[0℄ [1℄ [2℄ [3℄
Fig. 4.1: Example onsumer utility levels for dierent pries pi with xed param-
eters p−i = 0.8, a = 1, t = 0.5 and s = 1
[1℄ The rst interesting part of demand orresponds to rm i being a loal
monopolist. A small derease in prie leads to engaging previously idle
onsumers in trade; a small inrease leads to him losing ustomers to
the outside option.
[1℄-[2℄ The kink between parts [1℄ and [2℄. If the rm lowers its prie, it
steals the ustomers from the ompetitor; if it inreases its prie, some
ustomers swith to the outside optionnot to the ompetitor.
[2℄ This part orresponds to ompetitors being in eetive ompetition:
the market is overed, and any hange in pries leads to stealing on-
sumers fromor driving your onsumers tothe ompetitor. This o-
urs for pries pi ∈ (p−i − st, 2a− p−i − st).
[3℄ This part orresponds to rm i apturing the whole market, whih
ours at pries pi < p−i − st, or pi < a− st if rm −i pries itself out
of the market.
Of ourse, depending on the ompetitor's prie p−i and the parameters
a, s, and t, some of these regions may not exist at all:
• If there is no ompetitor (or p−i > a), then part [2℄ ollapses.
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• If p−i < a − st (low enough) and st > a, there is no part 1: even for
very high pi rm i would eetively ompete with rm −i.
• If p−i < st or st > a, there is no (protable) part 3: even for very
small pi > 0 rm i annot apture the whole market from rm −i,
either beause rm −i pries too low or the transport aross the whole
market is too expensive.
From the demand equation (4.3) we get the prot funtion by multiplying
by the prie pi: Πi(pi, p−i|a, s, t) = pi · Di(pi, p−i|a, s, t). We write out the
prot funtion overing the full spae of p−i ∈ [0, a] and the parameters a,s,t
∈ R+.










· pi (2a− p−i − st ≤ pi ≤ a)

















(pi ≤ a− st) ∧ (p−i ≥ a)
)
Funtion Πi(pi, p−i|a, s, t) is quasi-onave and ontinuous in pi. The pos-
itive part is stritly onave. Therefore, the funtion has a unique maximum
above zero. In fat, given any quadruplet (p−i, a, s, t), the maximiser lies
either in the interior of one of the non-zero piee-wise omponents [1℄ or [2℄
of the prot funtion, or in one of the orners of part [2℄. One example for
the demand and prot funtion for a parameter set at whih all regions exist
is depited in gure 4.2.
4.3.4 Best responses
Maximising the prot from equation (4.4) with respet to pi, we get rm
i's ontinuous best response funtion pi(p−i|a, s, t). For disussion, we name
the areas of the best response funtion. The piees span the spae for all

















Fig. 4.2: Demand and prot regions at xed parameters p−i, a, t, and s as in the
example in gure 4.1
parameters as shown in gure 4.3.
(4.5) pi(p−i|a, s, t) =

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The parameters for the market size s between the rms and for the relative
transportation ost t always enter in the same way as a produt for the
total transportation ost aross the whole market st, suh that we don't
need to treat them separately from now on. We disuss the rms' rationale
behind this best response funtion by letting st inrease and thereby taking
us through the dierent regions of the best response funtion.
GM Global monopolyours when the ompeting rm has totally pried
itself out of the market (p−i ≥ a) and the total transportation ost is
so low, suh that the rm nds it optimal to set a prie to just serve
the whole market (region [3℄ of the demand and of the prot equation).
CM Capturing the whole marketalso orresponds to part [3℄ of the de-
mand funtion. Here the ompetitor is ative in the market (p−i < a),
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but harges too high a prie (p−i ≥ 3st) suh that rm i maximises
prot in this region by harging the highest prie that allows it to
apture the whole market against the prie of the ompetitor.
EC Eetive ompetitionthe best response refers to an inner maximum
over the part [2℄ of demand and of prot equation. Here, the total
transportation ost is low enough relative to the reservation utility,
suh that the rm engages in ompetition that serves every onsumer
at positive utility.
IC Ineetive ompetitionrefers to the kink [1℄-[2℄ in the demand fun-
tion and in the prot funtion. The rm pries suh that the indierent
onsumer is just indierent between buying from either rm or not buy-
ing at all. Note that the pries in this region are strategi substitutes:
∂pi(·)/∂p−i < 0.
LM Loal monopolyrefers to inner maximum over part [1℄ of the demand
and prot funtion. The total transportation ost here is high enough,
suh that the rm an ignore the presene of the ompetitor and set










CM EC IC LM
Fig. 4.3: Areas of the best response funtion pi in p−ist spae
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4.3.5 Equilibrium
Solving the system of best response funtions, we nd that there is a unique
pure strategy symmetri Nash equilibrium, with an equilibrium prie p∗i for
any parameter tuple (a, s, t). We haraterise our equilibrium in terms of st's
relation to a as we are interested in the omparative statis with respet to












a < st ≤ a
a
2
if st > a
These equilibrium pries lie in three dierent regions of the best response
funtion (EC, IC, and LM)orresponding to three dierent rationales for
the behaviour of the rmsdepending on the transportation ost and the
distane between the rms, st. The equilibrium prie of the duopoly ase is
pitured with a solid line in gure 4.4. As referene ases we use the priing
of the one-produt monopolist (dotted line) and of a two-produt monopolist
(dashed line).
4
For small st, the rms engage in eetive ompetition and
their behaviour orresponds to standard understanding of lower pries at
lower levels of transportation ost or distane. The limit (as st→ 0) of this
ase is marginal ost priing in a Bertrand ompetition with a homogenous
good. For very high st values, the rms maximize prots by ating as loal
monopolists and setting the monopoly prie a/2.
In the middle region (st ∈ [a/2, a])we see the prie rst overshoot the
one-produt monopoly prie and then return to the one-produt monopoly
prie with higher st.
For st ∈ [2
3
a, a], the equilibrium lies in the region of ineetive ompeti-
tion and the duopoly rms at as a two-produt monopolist without expliit
ommuniation or oordination through repeated games. They are led solely
by prot maximization through setting pries. Notably, at all of these st, the
rms prie suh that the indierent onsumer is exatly indierent between
the two goods and the outside option. The rms deide not to engage in om-
petition, instead they evade ompetition by jointly exploiting the onsumers
as long as all onsumers partiipate.
4.3.6 Disussion
We argue, that this equilibrium behaviour reets a reasonable strategy in
pratie. The rigidity of the partitioning of the market and the adjustment
4
Please refer to Appendix 4.6 for the omputation of the referene ases.













Fig. 4.4: Equilibrium pries in the duopoly, and the 1-produt and 2-produt
monopoly referene ases
over pries is diretly driven by the dierent prie elastiities of demand
for the rms. In this equilibrium, they fae a disretely higher elastiity of
demand for prie inreases than for prie dereases beause they lose more
ustomers to the outside option when inreasing the prie, than they gain
onsumers from the ompetitor when lowering the prie.
Similarly, we an assess the eets of ineetive ompetition in the om-
parison of the duopoly setting to the two-produt monopoly setting. In the
region of st ∈ [2
3
a, a], the rms in the duopoly set pries like a two-produt
monopolist, although they ould engage in ompetition. Here, the market
is in fat less than twie the size of the market a one-produt monopolist
would deliberately deide to serve at its prot-maximising prie for the same
set of parameters. However, the mere inrease in the number of rms at the
positions as desribed in the model on this spei st-range does not derease
the equilibrium pries. As ompared to the one-produt monopolist, we shall
even see a prie inrease. This eet needs to be onsidered, when judging on
rm onentration in suh markets. The eet will be prevalent in markets
that at the same time are horizontally dierentiated, show limited market
expansion as reation to lower pries in the market, and have an outside
option for the onsumers.
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4.4 Empirial model
In this setion, we examine the predition of our model that the relationship
between the equilibrium market prie and the distane between the rms is
not monotoni aross all distanesin partiular, that it is not always posi-
tive. We do this by analysing the priing behaviour of petrol stations along
the station density in dierent ity distrits in Germany, where a distrit is
an administrative unit at the level of a ounty (Landkreis or Kreisfreie
Stadt in German), between a ommunity and a state.
5
We believe that this petrol market orresponds losely to the spatial om-
petition as presented in our model, despite some problems disussed briey
below. We take the station density, denoted as ζ, as a proxy for the inverse
of the distane between the rms (1/s) and we assume that the per distane
transportation ost t is equal in all ities. Thus, we look at an equilibrium
prie in our model as a funtion of the station density ζ, together with the
two kinks at ζ ′ and ζ ′′ as depited in gure 4.5.
station density ζ = 1/(st)ζ ′ = 3
2a









Fig. 4.5: Equilibrium prie predition for station density
It is lear that eetive ompetition (to the right of ζ ′) is abundant, and
this has in fat been shown in Karle (2005), for this partiular data set. We
do not believe that loal monopolies exist in the market for petrol in German
ity distrits, whih is why we do not expet to nd the part of the urve
that is to the left of ζ ′′ in gure 4.5.
5
City distrits therefore ontain a large ity and its losest surroundings.
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What we add to the disussion is the identiation of the middle setion
of ineetive ompetition: we rst rejet the hypothesis that the pries are
a downward-sloping funtion of station density aross all station densities,
then we nd a suitable value for a kink point ζ ′, and estimate a two-part
onneted linear urve around this kink.
To bridge the gap between the model of setion 4.3 and our empirial
work, we need to assume that onsumers and stations are in fat distributed
uniformly within the distrit, that onsumers do frequent the losest station,
eteris paribus, and that distrits have zero interation with eah other. Of
ourse, these are strit assumptions. For one, onsumers' loations are typi-
ally not given by their physial address, but rather by their every-day route
to and from work (whih furthermore may be in a dierent distrit). On the
other hand, we believe that any distortion from these problems should enter
in the same way irrespetive of the observed station density. Therefore, these
distortions should at worst hinder our analysis and at best have no eet,
but they should not help us identify the upward-sloping part of the urve
around the kink ζ ′ in gure 4.5.
4.4.1 Data
We use daily German petrol station prie data olleted for 78 days starting
April 13, 2005, from a servie website for retail petrol prie omparisons.
6
Some of the original sample entries had missing observations for our vari-
ables of interest. For example, Sunday and Saturday pries were largely not
reported by the stations, so we only inlude weekday pries in the sample.
While there were some observations from the rural distrits, only the ity dis-
trits ensure that the sample observations are representative of all the petrol
stations in a distrit. At the end, we are left with a onsistent sub-sample of
the original data that ontains daily prie observations for 807 petrol stations
in 93 major German ity distrits for 63 days.
The stations are divided into brand types: Premier-brand or A-type (e.g.,
Shell, BP), seond-tier or B-type, and independent or C-type, aording to
their dierentiation in the eyes of onsumers.
We treat the distrits as markets in the sense of setion 4.3. Our depen-
dent variable is the average retail prie of one litre of petrol in a distrit,
for eah day and brand type, whih gives us 14, 984 observations. We need
to ontrol for the hanges in variables that may inuene onsumer prefer-
enes (the brand type, inome) and marginal ost (loal wholesale prie per
litre), as these are held onstant in the model of setion 4.3. In fat, the loal
6
For a detailed data desription, see Karle (2005).
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wholesale prie hanged dramatially during the sample period, while inome
is dierent aross the distrits. We thus onsider as independent variables:
station density in a distrit, inome per apita in a distrit, the brand type
and the loal wholesale prie.
The inome is measured as loal GDP per apita in a ity; the loal GDP
is taken from Volkswirtshaftlihe Gesamtrehnungen der Länder 2003. The
wholesale prie is the daily prie reported for the petrol spot market in Rot-
terdam, by Energie-Informationsdienst; we take a 5-day moving average of
this prie to apture the adjustment lag of the retail prie to the wholesale
prie hanges. The loal wholesale prie is then the moving average of the
Rotterdam prie adjusted for time-persistent loal dierenes, whih are re-
ported weekly by Europe Oil-telegram. The station density, ζ, is measured
as the average number of stations per square kilometre in a distrit.
4.4.2 Testing for negative relationship between pries and station density
Suppose we know the value ζ ′ in gure 4.5. In order to test for negative
priestation density relationship, we rst partition the 14, 984 observations
into two parts aording to the kink station density, ζ¯ = ζ ′: with n1(ζ¯)
observations to the left of ζ¯, and n2(ζ¯) = 14, 984 − n1(ζ¯) to the right. We
then use OLS to estimate a two-part onneted linear urve with a kink at
ζ¯, whih gives us two slope parameters for the urves on the right and left
partitions. Last, we test the equality of these two parameters using a Chow
test, whih is stated formally below.
Of ourse, we annot ompute ζ ′. Instead, we repeat our estimation and
test pragmatially for dierent assumed values of ζ¯. We start with ζ¯ = 0.25
and move down in inrements of 0.005 until ζ¯ = 0.09.
To estimate the two urves with the onstraint that they meet at ζ¯, we
transform the station density to be around 0 with:
(4.7) adjusted station density = station density− ζ¯ ,
whih permits us an estimation of one interept for both parts of the urve
in a single OLS regression. Now we an t the two-part onneted linear








i X1 0 Z1 0

















4.4. Empirial model 105
where p1 and p2 are the n1 × 1 and n2 × 1 vetors of the dependent variable
observations (the average retail petrol pries in a distrit, for eah day and
brand type) in the left and right partitions, respetively; i is a vetor of 1's;
X1 andX2 are respetively n1×1 and n2×1 (left and right partition) matries
of station density observations; Zj is an nj × 4 matrix of ontrol variables
for two partitions (with j = 1, 2 and the ontrols being: moving average
of the Rotterdam wholesale prie adjusted for loal dierenes, inome, and
two dummies for brand types A and B); α is the prie at the onnetion of
the two lines (orresponds to the interept sine X1 ontains only negative
values after the transformation); β and γ are the slope oeients for the
left and right partitions (X1 and X2, respetively); δj is the 4 × 1 vetor of
oeients for Zj, j = 1, 2; and ǫ1,2's are the disturbanes (assumed i.i.d.).
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We allow for dierent eets of the Z ontrol variables in dierent parti-
tions, by partitioning all the Z ontrol variables aording to the same kink
station density ζ¯. Our hypothesised relationship between the station density
and prie is dierent for dierent partitions, but the model of setion 4.3 is
silent about the eets of independent variables other than station density.
There is no reason to assume that the eet of, for example, marginal ost
on prie is the same in the ranges of eetive and ineetive ompetition,
sine in the latter part the priing is driven by the kink feature of the demand
urve.
Given the empirial model in equation (4.8), our testable hypothesis is
(4.9) H0 : β = γ.
The data analysis shows that at any ζ¯, the right partition has a negative
relationship between the prie and station density. If the data an identify
the part of the urve that is between ζ ′′ and ζ ′ in Figure 4.5, then our test will
rejet the equality of slopes for the right and left partitions around ζ¯ = ζ ′.
Furthermore, the slope of the left partition should be positive.
We assume that the disturbanes have a zero mean and are unorrelated
with any of the regressors.
To ope with potential heterosedastiity, we alulate the standard errors
using the White ovariane matrix, suh that our estimation and tests are
heterosedastiity-robust.
4.4.3 Results
For all tested kinks points ζ¯ ≤ 0.14, we an rejet the null hypothesis of
equal slope oeients in both partitions with at least 98% ondene. Fur-
7
Our estimation and tests are robust to exlusion of the Z ontrols. We do not report
the results here, but they an be obtained diretly from the authors.
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thermore, the slope in the left partition is positive and signiant at a 1%
level for all kink points 0.105 < ζ¯ ≤ 0.135, and positive and signiant at a
10% level for all kinks ζ¯ ≤ 0.105 and at a 5% level for ζ¯ = 0.14. The model
ts equally well for all the tested kink points (R2 is slightly above 56%).
For large values of ζ¯, we annot rejet the null. Both slope oeients
are negative and signiant and annot be said to dier. The F -statistis
and the assoiated p-values of the above tests for all ζ¯ are given in Table 4.2
in the appendix 4.7.
Thus, we have shown that the relationship between station density and
pries is not monotoni. In partiular, the relationship is positive for low sta-
tion density, and beomes negative after a ertain kink point. We onlude
that this turning station density is around ζ¯ = 0.135 (the highest tested po-
tential kink point to deliver positive and signiant slope of the left partition
and still leave many observations to the left).
Finally, we t the urve in equation (4.8) for ζ¯ = 0.135. The results of
the regression are given in table 4.1. To illustrate the relationship, we piture
the tted prie urve against station density in gure 4.6.
Tab. 4.1: Estimation results of equation (4.8) with ζ¯ = 0.135
Variable Coeient (Std. Err.)
station density≤ ζ¯ 0.102∗∗ (0.012)
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Fig. 4.6: Predited pries
4.5 Conlusion
In this ontribution we showed that inreased ompetition may lead to higher
pries in a simple model of horizontal dierentiation. We espeially analysed
the omparative statis of this eet and we argued that it represents a
rationalisable strategy of rms. Furthermore, we showed its existene in the
retail gasoline market in Germany.
The set of markets in whih this eet surfaes is, as usual, limited but
exists, as we have shown in the empirial setion. The market needs to be
horizontally dierentiated, it needs to have an outside option for all potential
buyers, and its expansion due to lower pries needs to be limited. A stritly
kinked demand urve, as in our simple example, is in fat not a neessary
prerequisite, as one an show for a family of loally smoothed-out demand
urves. Clearly also this model is only powerful with restrited entry and
exit to the market, as we have for example in the short term examination
that is done in the empirial part of the paper.
The model is general enough in its desription of onsumers and produers
that it an also be applied to inreased integration of international produer-
supplier markets, whih ours when improved ommuniation tehnologies
108 Chapter 4. Ineetive ompetition
and opening of the loal markets redue the pereived transportation osts
8
between previously distant agents. Take the produt to be an intermediate
input, the two produers to be the suppliers of this input, and the onsumers
as the manufaturers of a nal good. As long as this produer-supplier market
fulls the onditions desribed in the previous paragraph, one of the model's
preditions is that for a ertain exogenous fall in the pereived transportation
osts (i.e., more world integration) the manufaturers experiene higher osts
of intermediate inputs in the short run.
From a ompetition poliy point of view, for the relevant markets with
features as above, ompetition authorities need to onsider this behaviour
when judging on market onentration as lassial onentration measures
might be misleading, if they purely measure market share ratios of the par-
tiipating rms.
Furthermore, the rms' strategy of `evading ompetition' and aommo-
dating to a shared market even without expliit ommuniation needs to
be appreiated as a reasonable and prot maximizing strategy of players in
markets, that seemed to follow standard intuition of ompetition.
8
These an inlude real transportation osts plus information osts, et.
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4.6 Appendix: Referene ases
We ompare the equilibrium prie of our duopoly game to two referene ases:
A one-produt monopoly and a two-produt monopoly.
4.6.1 One-produt monopoly
One way to look at one-produt monopoly is to x the prie of rm −i
in the duopoly prot equation (4.4) so as to prie it out of the market:
p−i = pˆ−i > a. Then, the regions [0℄ and [2℄ will disappear from the demand
funtion (for pries 0 < pi < a), and we are left with





· pi pi > a− st
[3℄ pi pi ≤ a− st













The two-produt monopoly an be omputed in the same framework, as one
rm setting pries pi and p−i simultaneously. The rm will use symmetri
pries as, without xed ost for the seond produt, it is always better to
supply the upper half of the market line with the produt loated at the
upper end than to supply it from the lower end of the market and vie versa.
This leaves more utility with the onsumers, whih an be extrated through
higher pries. Thus we get the symmetri pries pi = p−i and the prot is
given by





· 2 · pi pi > a−
st
2
[3℄ pi pi ≤ a−
st
2





if st < a
a
2
if a ≤ st
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4.7 Appendix: Chow Test results
Tab. 4.2: The F -statisti and the assoiated p-values for the Chow test for the
parameter stability at dierent ζ¯'s
inrement F p R2
.25 2.218132 .136419 .5654151
.245 2.094088 .1478908 .5654117
.24 2.280698 .131014 .564586
.235 2.1578 .1418687 .5645825
.23 2.038049 .1534272 .564579
.225 1.921477 .1657146 .5645757
.22 2.729819 .0985114 .5672181
.215 2.879594 .0897294 .5672224
.21 2.79763 .0944247 .5656854
.205 1.596892 .2063639 .5622169
.2 1.499953 .2206978 .5622142
.195 .1695287 .6805369 .56202
.19 .0887485 .7657784 .5620067
.185 .0685921 .7934014 .5620061
.18 1.978202 .1596008 .5626864
.175 2.476331 .1155927 .5624058
.17 2.615331 .1058565 .562429
.165 2.786674 .0950722 .5624336
.16 3.745212 .0529778 .5608998
.155 2.042018 .1530274 .5609509
.15 5.64495 .0175182 .5626013
.145 2.282735 .1308421 .5620812
.14 9.525839 .0020297 .5621582
.135 79.31693 5.89e-19 .5661687
.13 82.42374 1.23e-19 .5652712
.125 53.00962 3.48e-13 .5628271
.12 52.13296 5.44e-13 .5628073
.115 40.56149 1.96e-10 .5638012
.11 12.34939 .0004424 .5638718
.105 6.764859 .0093062 .563678
.1 6.484803 .01089 .5636718
.095 6.206994 .0127354 .5636657
.09 15.73746 .0000731 .5644021
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